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THE ROLE OF BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY IN THE
ARAB DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY DAIRY PROJECT
FOR PALESTINIAN ORPHANS: A CASE STUDY
IN PRIVATE BILATERAL FOREIGN AID

A Thesis

Presented to the

David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies

Brigham Young University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Masters of Arts

by

Daneil C. Olson

April 1985

This Thesis, by Daneil C. Olson, is accepted in its present form by the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies of Brigham Young University as satisfying the thesis requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The involvement of Brigham Young University (hereinafter referred to as "BYU") (Provo, Utah, USA) during the period 1960 through 1963 with a boys' orphanage and dairy farm operated by the Arab Development Society in Jericho (Israeli occupied West Bank) is an example of private bilateral foreign aid. BYU's role was to help build the dairy project to increase the opportunities for the young boys at the ADS boys' town and help to prepare them for a better life. This was to be done by the example of the personnel sent to the project from BYU and also by the instruction of dairy management and milk processing skills. Moreover, the project would supply fresh dairy products to improve the diet of the young orphan boys. The dairy farm was intended to be a model dairy farm for all of the Middle East.

The purpose of this study is to examine nine essential planning principles in the selecting and implementing an aid project. These nine principles will then be used to analyze BYU's involvement with the ADS dairy project. The project is presented from a historical viewpoint. An analysis is mainly given retrospectively at the end of the history of the BYU involvement phase of the project.

The nine points by which the case study will be analyzed are essential in the planning of any project. All private bilateral aid projects need to adhere to the following points. These points have been delineated by Addison Maunder.¹

First, the project must be based on careful analysis of factual situations. The project needs to be studied properly to obtain all the real facts pertaining to the objectives of the project.

Second, the project needs to be selected for actions which concern recognized needs. The most important needs of the receivers must be ascertained and the objectives defined clearly to meet those needs.

Third, the project needs to be oriented to the existing technical, economic and social level of the receiving institution in order to make the project achievable. The project initiators must evaluate the ability levels and resources of the receivers in order to develop objectives that can be attained, some short-term and some long-term.

Fourth, the objectives need to be defined clearly at all levels in terms that people will understand and without any obvious hidden agendas.

Fifth, open communication and democratic methods are essential in developing the project. Clear channels and methods of communication are needed and the democratic, or the meeting of the minds, method of decision-making needs to be followed.

Sixth, the project needs to be flexible to meet the long-term situations and short-term changes and special emergencies. The project needs built-in flexibility to ensure that some changes do not drastically interrupt the implementation of the project.

Seventh, the project needs to be educational and directed toward bringing about improvement in the ability of the people to solve their own problems. The project ought to direct its educational objectives to helping the receivers learn how to solve their own problems in order for them to become more self-sufficient.

Eighth, the project should be carried out by well-trained personnel who are effectively supervised. The donor personnel need to have the necessary practical ability to implement the project and the supervisors need this same ability in order to help solve any problems which may arise.

Ninth, the project must be well planned with the proper provision for evaluating the results. The project needs to have well-defined objectives and well-defined methods of data collection and reporting in order to obtain a valid and credible evaluation of the project.

The methodological approach for this thesis is a case study. The project was researched from its conception to BYU's termination in the project. In addition, it covers a time period of several years beyond BYU's active participation. The sources of information came from the Wilkinson Presidential Papers in the BYU Library Archives, letters and writings of Bert Bigler, which are in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints Historical Archives, personal interviews with relevant individuals, and the Jerusalem Post newspaper office in Israel.

The results of the study yielded the following major observations. BYU was not directly involved in the planning but should have taken a more active part in planning and evaluating the project once it became officially involved in funding part of the operation. This deficiency definitely created many problems such as allowing the ADS manager to control the entire million dollar project without having a knowledge of dairy project planning and management, allowing the manager to continue his poor management practices, allowing poor communication practices and hidden agendas, and allowing cultural conflicts to occur because a proper orientation was not provided to the donor personnel who were sent to the on-site project. Moreover, there were personality conflicts

which could have been minimized had there been better planning and understanding of the key figures involved before BYU became involved. The result was a modern dairy operation which never has been fully and consistently operated. The short-term of one to two years involvement after all the equipment was put into operation resulted in inadequate training and supervision of personnel to manage and operate the dairy and milk processing equipment on a continual basis once the donor personnel left the project. The dairy was not effectively operated because of the poor management of the receivers and the insufficient use of criteria such as the nine principles of planning, monitoring, and evaluating the project.

While this particular case study does not represent a totally successful example of private bilateral foreign aid, it can be used as a learning exercise for improving organization, administration and communication in the development of other private bilateral foreign aid projects.

The story of this project is also an interesting aspect of the Wilkinson era in the history of Brigham Young University.

CHAPTER 2

PRIVATE BILATERAL FOREIGN AID DEFINITION AND CRITERION

Private bilateral foreign aid is the transfer of material and/or nonmaterial resources from a donor in one country to a receiver in another country through legal channels external to the government of the two countries involved with minimal considerations for the foreign policies of the countries involved and maximum considerations of the humanitarian results of the person to person process.

The basic goals of providing bilateral aid is to improve the life style of the recipients through the introduction of new technology with the proper supervision and training in order that the recipients may learn how to be self-sufficient.

Careful planning is essential to the success of any project. The intent of good planning is to insure the proper selection of a project, implement it in the most efficient manner, and reach the goals set forth. While the literature concerning planning is immense, the focus of concern for this thesis is that for any bilateral project to be successful certain planning principles must be followed. Those planning principles have been delineated by Maunder.²

Addison H. Maunder is world renowned for his work in extension program planning. He has worked in extension planning in the United States and Europe for at least thirty years. The Food and Agricultural Organization selected Maunder to assemble an extension manual. The principles which he

selected are a synthesis of numerous articles including his own in planning extension, community development and general social change. The principles are seen as a whole as fundamental points for a project in planned change.

Maunder discusses thirteen planning principles in the extension reference manual. Three of these principles (Maunder's 3, 10, and 12) refer to the rural family and community involvement in the project. These principles were omitted because they do not directly apply to all projects in general. Two other principles (Maunder's numbers 7 and 13) were combined to condense the material presented. In addition, the notion of no obvious hidden agendas was added to Maunder's principle number 4 and open communication was added to Maunder's principle number 6. Moreover, the order in which Maunder presented his principles was changed to facilitate the organization of the case study material and subsequent analysis.

What will be presented in this chapter is a definition of each principle and a brief discussion of how each principle may be established.

1. Base the project planning on careful analysis of factual situations.

All of the relevant and available facts bearing upon the land, the people, the homes, the customs, the communities, the organizations, the institutions and the agencies operating in the area should be taken into consideration. These facts need to be examined in relation to the objectives of the project. Also needed in the planning process is an understanding of the recipient's desired intentions coupled with an extensive understanding of the cultural traditions surrounding the administration of projects.

To understand a people's religion, culture, and traditions as well as their language not only shows an interest and concern for them but it also provides a basis from which the donor can more successfully interact with the receiver. Without such interest and concern a poor working relationship can

easily emerge and the bonds favoring an efficient and successful project will not be established. With insufficient interest and understanding by either staff and administration, a lack of integration and interfacing exists. This can lead to a separation which in turn can provide the seeds for a lack of a coherent project.

Proper project planning encompasses the knowledge, facts and issues of the administration and personnel at the project site as well as in the donor country. A thorough examination of the recipients' plans and system of implementation is paramount before setting forth the donor's plan and system of implementation, the political environment of the recipients' administration needs to be understood in order to efficiently plan the implementation of the project.

The issues to be treated by both groups of the joint-venture also must be presented thoroughly so that a minimum of misunderstanding will ensue. Details of the issues need to be itemized and worked on jointly in order that all personnel are kept abreast of the thinking, actions, and problems of others.

The knowledge of the situation and the presentation of the necessary issues provides for a means by which both parties can pursue their respective objectives in concert with the realities of the situation which in turn enhances the project's success.

2. Select projects for action which concern recognized needs.

To be effective work must begin with the interests of the receiving institution and then work toward consideration of other problems which may not be recognized in the beginning. Complete factual information will help determine the priority of the projects.

Projects are intended to meet the needs for a change but before any change can take place a recognized need by the receiver for a change is necessary. If the need by the receiver is not yet apparent, then a relationship has to be established by which this need can be understood and desired. The

receiver's problems need to be diagnosed and an examination of alternative routes and goals is needed. In addition, the goals and intended actions are to be established. The intentions then are to be transformed into change efforts.³

3. Orient the project to the existing technical, economical, and social level of the receiving institution in order to make the project achievable.

The project needs to be oriented to the receiver. Through the factual analysis of the receiver, the donor should know the existing technical, economic, and social level in order to understand how to implement the project. Also included in this orientation, the personnel working in the area should be given a proper briefing of what they will be doing.

Many times projects are attempted that are far too extensive for the economic, social, and technical level of a receiving institution. Therefore, the project ought to consider the level of education of the people to be involved, their customs, skills, existing beliefs and the practicality of the project in the area. The project ought to eventually become self-sufficient and self-sustaining; therefore, the receiving institution needs to have the capacity to achieve this purpose. Achieving this purpose demands that the sender knows the capacity of the receiver so that that capacity may never be exceeded too much.

To be achievable the project must select a limited number of the biggest problems which can be the most easily solved. At the same time select a few other problems which may take a longer period to solve. Careful attention is necessary in the problem selection in order that the problem solving in each phase will clear the way for the next phase of the problem solving. Moreover, such factors as finances, proper magnitude, organizational appropriateness, and receiver skills to be established need to be carefully scrutinized.

The finances need to be sufficient at the out-set to avoid any set back in the implementation phase which would result in frustration and discouragement of all involved in the project. The project needs to be reasonable in its size and cost to avoid implementing a project that would not be feasible to operate and maintain.

The correct technical rationality, which is the core instrumental action which produces the desired output of an organization,⁴ is essential to implement each phase of a project at the appropriate time. In addition, there needs to be a sufficient number of personnel qualified to administer the project once it is operationalized.

Moreover, there needs to be sufficient interest by the local people in learning the types of skills necessary to carry on the project and to supply the necessary on-going qualified labor force.

Moreover, the personnel selected to administer the on-site project ought to have an orientation concerning the religion, culture, and traditions of the recipient country. Ideally, those selected to provide the orientation of the religion, culture, and traditions should have lived and worked in the country and locale for two to five years where the project is to be implemented.

Many times personnel selected for a particular project are intrigued and enchanted by the thought of living and working in a foreign land, not to mention the increased monetary benefits and opportunities to travel. However, the cultural shock caused by a different style of living soon becomes a reality. The living conditions often are not what was expected, and the adjustments necessary for new living conditions become hectic.

If the effort is made by the donor administration of the bilateral project to inform the personnel being considered about the living conditions, the

sanitation precautions needed in buying, preparing and eating local food stuffs; the housing conditions, costs, and availability; the transportation problems, needs and costs; the schooling available and costs for their children; the social activities available for the wives and children, etc.; then possibly the field of applicants will weed themselves out, leaving only the serious and most interested and qualified personnel. In any event the personnel will be more prepared mentally and emotionally for the new living conditions awaiting them. Fewer adjustments will perhaps be encountered and likewise the personnel will be happier and more productive.

The families of the personnel selected for the project often are most affected by the site environment. Settling in assistance should be given to the spouses. Recreational opportunities should be provided, including travel out of the country.

When the donor administration knows the problems and circumstances faced by the on-site personnel then the donor administration will be more understanding and aware of the problems and the necessary planning and support can be extended to ensure that the on-site personnel are prepared to carry out their tasks with a minimum of frustration and hold-ups.

4. Clearly define objectives at all levels in terms that people will understand and with no obvious hidden agendas.

The objectives at the planning stage need to be well defined. The objectives must give the directions in which the project is intended to develop and how and when the personnel are to implement each stage of the project.

Each individual needs to have his tasks and authority outlined, and all personnel need to know and understand the tasks of each other so that efforts are not duplicated or questioned unjustly. Effective supervision to see that the

tasks are being understood and accomplished is essential so that proper and timely assistance can be given when an individual is not getting a task done.

Time tables of the project need to be discussed and outlined. Deadlines are necessary and must be set and monitored to enhance effective and smooth implementation of the project in all phases. Where problems occur, the supervisors and personnel ought to make written reports explaining the difficulties.

The proper evaluation of the intended objectives will largely determine if the objectives set forth are practical and achievable. Moreover, the observations and discoveries of how to better implement the different phases or aspects of the project need to be written and evaluated by all personnel involved in order to better understand the problems and perspectives of all personnel.

The experiences and learning gained by the on-site personnel need to be seriously and effectively listened to and pondered by all administrators and other personnel. The practical aspects and on-site experience is part of the most important information by which to determine whether the objectives were clearly defined. The on-site experiences will suggest the need for any required redefinitions of objectives.

The project should not have an obvious hidden agenda—that is, a hidden purpose which would bring unstated political, economic, or personal benefits to the donors and recipients. Hidden agendas have the potential to create disillusionment among the personnel and even legal problems with the donor and recipient countries.

All issues and motives need to be discussed openly. As soon as one counterpart discovers something awry, then the whole project is suspect in the

minds of those who become aware of the scheme. In all projects a common ground of trust must be cultivated and established and adhered to. No one wants to be cheated or manipulated and once it is discovered the project is likely to be doomed.

The private bilateral aid project must satisfy a valid need and the need and purpose for the project ought to be stated clearly and ethically by both entities. To do otherwise, when realized, creates the supposition that the other entity is trying to misuse the project for benefits other than those set forth in the bilateral agreement.

The hidden agenda will skew the thinking of the guilty entity as it presses for the hidden agenda goals rather than the supposed goals of the agreement. Such behavior is self-defeating and very detrimental to human relations and international relations. Therefore, private bilateral aid projects should not be undertaken if an obvious hidden agenda is involved. Honesty is still the best good neighbor policy.

5. Use open communication and democratic methods in developing the project.

The decision-making ought to be a bilateral process. Clear facts need to be presented and the two organizations ought to come to a meeting of the minds as to what would be best for the project within the scope of the financial and labor capabilities. The major means by which bilateral decision-making can be successful is through meaningful communication patterns.

Clear and open channels of communication to all personnel are required. Problems as well as achievements need to be discussed regularly and openly among the administrators and personnel. In the event of any dissatisfaction about the performance of any of the personnel or administrators,

the matter ought to be confronted and discussed judiciously and tactfully. Open channels of communication enhance opportunities of positive and negative feedback. This flow of feelings and ideas is needed to better understand the ongoing process and problems of the project and provides the necessary information to alert the proper personnel of the deficiencies, and possibly the appropriate way to correct them.

All pertinent data requests or questions which arise by either the donor or the recipient administrator ought to be communicated and resolved promptly to avoid frustration and any gap in communication.

In the case of any questionable behavior by any individual on the project site, the issue needs to be discussed by the administrator promptly and directly. If justified, the on-site administrator needs to report this occurrence directly to the donor administrator and not through or by some other person directly or indirectly involved.

The proper use of communication channels can enhance democratic decision-making by getting the personnel, especially the receiver group, more actively involved. Since they will be the ones undergoing the changes they need to feel that they have something invested in the project and they will feel more responsible to help solve the problems. Their investment in the outcome of the project and their involvement is needed to build a base to help make them self-sufficient.

6. Keep the project flexible to meet long-term situations and short-term changes and special emergencies.

The project needs to be flexible in order to adjust to the short-term problems or unexpected changes of time, costs, personnel, as well as other factors. This would also be true for the long-term.

The project needs to meet some of the immediate needs or expectations of the receiving institution or else the interest will diminish. Always make allowances for emergencies and to ensure the continuity and flexibility of the project the same personnel at the project site should be kept as a group as long as it is feasible.

If there is a lack of flexibility the short-term changes or emergencies will not be met and the project will be in jeopardy. If the project's preliminary goals and implementation are not achieved then the implementation of the next phase will be hindered causing a failure to meet the needs set forth in the project planning.

7. Make the project educational and direct it toward bringing about improvement in the ability of the people to solve their own problems.

Any new project will be educational but the emphasis needs to be on making it a positive educational experience for everyone. Participation of personnel from the receiving institution in the planning, implementation and maintenance of the project transfers a great deal of knowledge and skills. It puts them in direct contact with the new information and technology and provides a hands-on experience which is the best educational process. The project needs to be aware of its training function and actively pursue a course whereby all the participants of the project are provided an opportunity to be edified through the work.

The need to establish relevant training programs should be investigated and followed through.

8. The project should be carried out by well-trained personnel effectively supervised.

The proper selection of motivated personnel who are qualified, informed and prepared for the on-site project is a necessity. The key is to obtain truly qualified personnel who are highly experienced in the practical work they are to carry out.

Personnel must be reasonably compatible at the on-site project and able to work efficiently in the new environment which may include action and thinking processes totally different than what has been experienced previously. Avoiding the selection of personnel which may be detrimental to the implementation and longevity of the project is basic. Administration and "Technical assistance personnel must acquire a subtle and sophisticated understanding of the problems and be sensitive of the people with whom they are dealing the American; if he is doing his job, must be friend, teacher, leader, critic, and above all student. At the same time, he must in some way, retain humility, good humor and dignity."⁵

A give-and-take attitude of learning and understanding must be present for a good working relationship to develop. Much learning will occur bilaterally. Learning how to teach is as important as knowing what needs to be taught.

The selected personnel need to make a strong commitment to do everything possible to ensure the success of the project. This requires a unity in the desire to work diligently together to achieve the success of the project. Each individual needs to feel a strong obligation to help work out the problems and bolster others in times of stress and set backs. This presupposes that the administration developing the project and selecting the proper personnel is highly

sensitive and aware of the character, educational, and technical qualities needed.

9. Good project planning provides for evaluation of the results.

Evaluation is important to provide an accountability of the resources, it presents the opportunity to orient the project to a more realistic course, and monitoring is necessary to keep the project on tract.

Evaluation of any project is dependent upon how carefully the objectives are defined. The objectives need to be defined in such a manner that they can be measured and evaluated. Reports and/or records need to be made periodically stating the status of the work in terms of the desired objectives. Many social objectives are somewhat intangible but with sufficient effort the terms of the desired action can be defined and appraised. The evaluation of the objectives are based on proper measurement criteria of the objectives and the proper collection of information to be used in the measurement process.

By orienting the project to the realistic situation and problems the needs can be more clearly defined. Involving the receiver in the planning can lead to a more acceptable and workable project for both parties. Providing the proper internal management criteria will aid in the preparation of the on-site personnel of both groups to be better oriented as to why and how the project is to be implemented. Developing the project for the receiver to take over the project will better focus and facilitate the educational and training procedures so that the receivers will help solve their own problems and become self-sufficient. In addition, allowing for proper evaluation can determine the effectiveness of the planning, implementation, achievements, and failures of a project. The periodic monitoring coupled with the other points mentioned above will enhance the probability of a project achieving its objectives.

CHAPTER 3

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE STUDY; THE ADS-BYU DAIRY PROJECT

The Arab Development Society (ADS) is a school and training center for Palestinian orphan boys. Three miles from modern Jericho, Israel is a land concession registered to the Arab Development Society. This concession in the 1950's originally encompassed 5,000 acres of arid wasteland lying some 1000 feet below sea level. The temperature may reach as high as 120 degrees Fahrenheit in August with an average daily reading of 100 degrees through the summer months. Two miles to the west lies the Jordan River which drops to approximately 1300 feet below sea level. It is upon this land, which lies on both sides of the road that links Jerusalem and Amman, that Musa Alami, with the help of the ADS and funds from other institutions, built an oasis for refugee orphan boys.

Alami was born May 8, 1897 in Jerusalem⁶ and was educated in law at Cambridge University in England. He practiced law in Palestine and was active in Middle East politics and by 1933 had become the Attorney General in the British Administration. This civil service post made Alami the highest ranking Palestinian in politics during the British mandate period.⁷ He held this civil service position until 1937, when he was dismissed after being charged for negligence in the prosecution of Arabs accused of sabotage. The guilty Arabs were sometimes acquitted; however, the acquittals occurred during Alami's absence. The prosecutions had been undertaken by a senior British officer,

who was standing in for Alami while he was in Karlsbad (Europe) undergoing medical treatment. Alami was subsequently exiled in 1937 to Lebanon⁸ and was not able to return to Palestine until May 1941.⁹ Even during his exile, Alami was active in Arab politics. He was a member of the Palestine Arab delegation to the London Conference in 1939¹⁰ and after his return to Palestine he was appointed to represent Palestine at the Arab conference in Alexandria, Egypt in 1944.¹¹

Alami by March 1945 was determined to aid the plight of the Palestinian farmers and peasants and was instrumental in founding the ADS for this purpose.¹² However, the ADS was not very successful in achieving its goals of aiding the farmers and peasants and with the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the aims of the ADS had to be altered.

Originally there was no water on the land, and experts had said there was not any fresh subterranean water. Alami was not to be denied the experience of at least trying to find water on the land. In 1949 the first well was dug mostly by hand. Alami had hired Palestinian refugees from the nearby refugee camp. At the 75 foot level fresh water was found. Other wells were dug, and by 1953 ten pumps were raising 200,000 gallons of water per hour.¹³

An experimental crop production farm had been begun; then in the early 1950's a poultry project was implemented, and within two years the farm was producing 80,000 birds.

In the early 1950's the orphanage had been started with some 18 young Palestinian boys. These boys were housed in buildings that had been built at the time the first well was being dug to house the well diggers and their families. Later more dormitories, shops and other buildings were added, as was a large swimming pool for the boys.

Development of the Initial Idea

By the late 1950's Alami was pondering the idea of establishing a dairy on the land concession to provide milk and milk products for the boys. Alami was seeking help to achieve this new venture. In 1958, the American aid program, which was known at that time as "Point IV," had become interested in the refugee boystown. Point IV "... provided the funds for the education and subsistence of 100 extra boys..."¹⁴ bringing the total to 160. The Ford Foundation donated money for dormitories and classrooms.

Alami Meets Bigler in Utah

Dale Clark, then a banker in Farmington, Utah, in 1959, had been interested in Alami's refugee boys' ranch as early as 1951 as a result of his involvement in the Point IV program in the Middle East. Clark had known of Alami's desire for a dairy project, as did Hugh Walker of the Ford Foundation. These men made arrangements for Alami to meet Bert Bigler in the Spring of 1959, a Jersey dairy owner in West Jordan, Utah. Norman Burns, the director of the United States Government Economics Aid Program in Jordan and a relative to Bigler, had given Alami an envelope containing Bigler's address in Utah.¹⁵ Burns had written a note on the envelope introducing Alami to Bigler. Upon Alami's arrival in Utah, he requested Bigler's help in locating and purchasing all the equipment necessary to set up the milking parlor and milk processing plant at the refugee boystown.

Clark became responsible for the Ford Foundation's funds which had been provided for the purchase of the dairy equipment. Alami told Bigler to buy all the equipment from the United States and to buy only the best. Alami wanted the project to be the best equipped dairy in the Middle East.

The dairy equipment had been purchased in and around the state of Utah, forwarded to the Rynn Export Company in New York and then shipped to the Port of Aqaba on the north end of the Red Sea. The equipment was then trucked to the boystown near Jericho, Jordan. (Before the 1967 Arab-Israeli War Jericho was still part of Jordan).

The Ford Foundation had already given the ADS grants amounting to some three million dollars over the years to aid the refugee boys. In addition, the Ford Foundation agreed to help with the dairy, if Alami could get the cows and a dairyman to supervise the project.

Ernest Wilkinson Becomes Involved

Shortly after Alami met Bigler in the spring of 1959, Clark also approached Ernest L. Wilkinson, President of Brigham Young University (BYU) in Provo, Utah operated by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS or Mormon Church). Clark tried to interest Wilkinson in involving BYU and the LDS Church in the dairy project.¹⁶ Clark's intent was to have President Wilkinson interest the LDS Church President, David O. McKay, in the project. Therefore, the LDS Church could play a role by way of its educational institution in a private bilateral foreign aid project.

President Wilkinson was known as a man who got things done. It was felt that if he could be sold on the ADS dairy project, the project would have a better chance of becoming a reality. On a nondated piece of paper Wilkinson stated, "Three men came to see me from Jordan: Cy Fryer, International Development Service (IDS), Alami, Iyad Affefi (no title given), and M. L. Wilson, who had been the head of the "New Deal" under President Truman."¹⁷ In addition, Hugh Walker, the director of the Ford Foundation for the Middle East, and Alami had visited Wilkinson in the spring of 1959. Walker had previously

asked Clark if "... we out in Utah can give them assistance in personnel—they (ADS) have a preference for our people [the LDS or Mormon people]"¹⁸

On May 5, 1959, President Wilkinson received a letter from Fryer stating:

Your letter of April 29th brought us joy. I am glad you met Hugh Walker and that truly great Arab friend of ours Mussa Bey Alami. You will see more of Mussa Bey, when you come to Jordan and examine some of the work he is doing, with the help of the Ford Foundation, among the refugees in Jordan. I am looking forward to joining with Hugh to take you there and to seeing Jerusalem and some of the problems of the people in and around it through your eyes.¹⁹

Hugh Walker had written a letter expressing his delightful experience visiting with Wilkinson and his colleagues on the BYU campus. "Musa Alami was extremely impressed with not only the individuals he met, but with the atmosphere that prevailed."²⁰

Wilkinson Visits the ADS Project

Wilkinson visited the ADS project in June 1959 and upon his return to Provo, Utah he made a report listing many details of what Alami wanted in personnel, the accommodations for them, and their salary. Moreover, Wilkinson said,

Because of the great work that Musa Bey Alami is doing, I am very desirous that we find three or four men to furnish him. I have a personal conviction we will do much more good in a great private enterprise of this kind that is being watched all over Jordan rather than to help some government enterprise.

In addition he stated,

If you are successful in getting the right kind of men for Musa Bey Alami, I am sure that we will bring students to BYU each year from Jordan. They will have two students to enter in the fall of 1960 and probably two each year thereafter. The BYU could exert a great influence in this backward state of Jordan.²¹

In early December 1959, Edwin Butterworth of the Deseret News heard of Brigham Young University's interest in the dairy project at Jericho and requested a "news story on a mission to the state of Jordan which is being administered by BYU. L. B. Bigler of West Jordan, Utah is one of the participants, I understand."²² President Wilkinson wrote to Butterworth explaining that BYU was not going to administer any mission in the State of Jordan. Wilkinson had been worried about how the Israelis would view the project. He did not want to arouse their attention. This is why in 1959 he wanted a low profile and had stated

I am merely acting as a personal representative of Honorable Musa Bey Alami, one of the great leaders of Jordan in trying to recruit certain technicians for the ADS, a private company which operates a boy's school in Jordan The BYU officially is not a party to it at all It turns out that Bigler is quite a publicity seeker. But we must give no publicity to this. When and if Bigler and others are actually engaged by the ADS, I think that an article in the newspapers telling about it would be appropriate. All that we can claim, however, is that BYU has helped to recruit this staff.²³

Alami wrote a letter to Bigler in July of 1960, expressing his desire to start the dairy farm as soon as possible. "I request you to try and obtain the necessary number of head of cattle to start this farm."²⁴ In a letter to Wilkinson the same month, Alami talked of using KLM to fly the donated cattle. Alami had quoted \$15,000 for shipping the cattle, but KLM's price was \$17,500. Alami was willing to pay the difference himself, if the cattle could be ready by November 1960. Alami stated, "I am hoping that you will be able to get my Mormon good friends to make this a truly Mormon project which you and President McKay can dedicate and have formally start sometime in December."²⁵

In August 1960, Dr. Rudger H. Walker, the new Dean of Agriculture, became involved in the Alami project. Walker had just returned from Iran, where he had been head of the "Point IV" program for Utah State University.²⁶

Wilkinson sent a memorandum to Walker informing him that Alami had requested that BYU try to get 30 to 40 heifers donated by the American Jersey Association or some other association for the ADS. Wilkinson had explained that Bigler had been attempting to get the heifers donated by the Jersey Association, but had received negative responses from two of the officers. Now Alami was asking for BYU's help in obtaining the animals. Wilkinson was now beginning to exert his influence as President of BYU to involve the LDS Church. Wilkinson had told R. H. Walker that BYU, with the consent of the Church, would advance \$15,000 or more for transportation of the cattle to Jordan.

Bigler to Stay Only Six Months

Hugh Walker of the Ford Foundation in Beirut, Lebanon learned from Alami that Bigler would be coming to Jericho and that he personally would select the cattle. Bigler was planning to go to Jericho for six months to help set up the dairy project. "The wonderful news regarding the cattle and equipment has certainly spread throughout this area and everyone is anxiously awaiting the date Bigler will arrive."²⁷

By the end of August 1960, Bigler was having trouble getting the cattle donated and had written to Alami and explained the situation. Bigler wanted to buy the cattle in Europe with the funds Wilkinson was arranging to have donated to cover the cost of transportation. Alami wrote to Wilkinson stating that

This is distressing news to me because of the publicity that has already been made about a "BYU Project" all over the area, and because of the terrible disappointment that everybody here will have.²⁸

Alami was billing the project as a "BYU project" but it was not officially one. President Wilkinson was still assuming that the LDS Church would

donate the needed money to ship the dairy cattle to Jericho. Wilkinson was of the opinion that BYU would be authorized to utilize the funds for purchasing and shipment of the cattle as had been discussed before. However, he needed to obtain financial clearance on this before they could go ahead with the program. R. H. Walker did not feel that they would be delayed on this matter and they could move ahead as soon as they obtained the added information they needed from the Agricultural attaché in Europe and other sources which they had been working on.

R. H. Walker was pleased to hear that Alami was thinking in terms of the project being a BYU project. Therefore, R. H. Walker felt that some special emphasis should be given upon arrival of the cattle to the role BYU was playing. Good pictures and public relations should be given much consideration.²⁹

A temporary set back occurred when President Wilkinson received a call from Wendell Mendenhall, chairman of the Building Committee of the LDS Church, in which Wilkinson was informed that the Committee did not appropriate the funds for the purchase of cattle. The Committee apparently had a number of questions to ask about the on-site preparation for the acceptance, feeding, and caring for the cattle once they arrived at Jericho. R. H. Walker was asked by Wilkinson to see Mendenhall and explain the situation in Jericho; as well as Walker's experiences in the Middle East and his membership on the board of directors of the American University at Beirut.³⁰

R. H. Walker's Ploy for BYU's Management Control

As the involvement of Wilkinson and Brigham Young University increased, Wilkinson grew more uneasy with Bigler's level of involvement. The personality conflict between Wilkinson and Bigler was of Wilkinson's own making as he became more involved in the project. Even though Wilkinson had recom-

mended Bigler as the dairyman to go to the ADS project near Jericho, he felt that Grant Richards, a dairy specialist at BYU would have been a better choice.³¹

In a memorandum dated November 9, 1960, Wilkinson agreed with R. H. Walker that it was most unfortunate that Alami made direct arrangements with Bigler to buy the dairy equipment, because it was felt that Bigler and Alami had unrealistic aspirations. Wilkinson suggested that R. H. Walker write to Alami and tell him what he felt on this issue, explaining that they did not want a large plant to lie idle and be a monument to their mistakes of building a plant beyond their needs.³²

Following the conversation of R. H. Walker and Wilkinson concerning Bigler, Walker reviewed the correspondence on the entire project and their relationship with Bigler. According to the information R. H. Walker obtained from the Wilkinson files, Bigler was selected for the assignment by Dr. Hallam and Dale Clark.³³ Apparently his qualifications were reviewed by Wilkinson, and Bigler on occasion had met with Wilkinson to discuss the problems of the dairy project. However, Wilkinson did not have all the facts in his file concerning Bigler's involvement and Alami's intentions at the project site. R. H. Walker was not well informed on the details of the ADS project, and Wilkinson was not able to inform him properly. R. H. Walker had never discussed the scope of the project with Alami or Bigler. He failed to discuss any issues with others involved in the project except Wilkinson. Walker did not obtain understanding of the problems nor was he sensitive enough to the people with whom he was dealing. Wilkinson had asked Walker to keep abreast of the project, but he eventually developed his own plan of involving BYU directly with full management control.

In a memorandum to President Wilkinson, R. H. Walker expressed his view that Alami was really counting on BYU for their help and cooperation.

Walker stated that if the Mormon Church was authorizing Brigham Young University to spend the funds to support the dairy project, then they should pick up the ball and proceed with the program as a Brigham Young University project under complete management of Brigham Young University. In this way Walker et al. could determine what was going to be done and who was going to do it. On the basis of this premise Walker made the following recommendations:

1. That when the finance committee of the Church makes the funds available they do so on condition that the project be under the complete control of BYU, and that the BYU designate one of its staff members to fill the position on Alami's school where he will serve as leader of the dairy development project. In doing so it is to be understood that the ADS will pay the salary and furnish the transportation and housing for this BYU staff member during the time of his assignment to the project, which is to be not less than 2 years, including normal vacation periods in accordance with University practices.
2. That Seymour Mikkelsen be asked to take this assignment for the next 2 years, and at the same time he be assured of his position at BYU upon completion of his assignment on this project.³⁴

Walker and Wilkinson had discussed and agreed that, when the funds were allocated, BYU should have full responsibility for the project, which included the expenditure of funds and the selection and designation of the personnel to be appointed by the ADS to participate in the establishment of the dairy project. Mikkelsen's name was submitted, and it was further suggested that the funds be set up to BYU without reference to Bigler, and that BYU be given the responsibility for the overall supervision of the project, including the working relationship with the ADS, the expenditure of the funds and the selection of personnel to be employed.³⁵

On November 16, 1960 Wilkinson received an approval from the LDS Church expenditure committee for the use of a sum not to exceed \$17,500. Wilkinson immediately wrote to Alami stating the restrictions on the funds.

In the first place, the committee does not feel it is advisable for us to spend this much money in reliance upon having Mr. Bigler go to Jordan for a period of only six months. If it meets with your approval, we are therefore advising him that we do not think it wise for him to go, but rather that we are going to send Mr. Seymour Mikkelsen, who is a member of our animal husbandry staff at BYU and who will stay for two years. He has also good mechanical aptitude, and if he is sent we do not believe it will be necessary to send anyone else to assemble the dairy equipment. He will be able to do that himself.

The second limitation laid down by my Expenditures Committee is that there be some definite understanding between you and Mr. Mikkelsen before he goes as to his compensation.³⁶

BYU Officially Becomes Involved

The November 16, 1960 approval of the funds by the LDS Church Expenditure Committee and the restrictions on the funds gave Wilkinson and R. H. Walker the necessary tool to have BYU become officially involved in the administration of selecting, buying, and shipping the dairy animals as well as the selection of personnel to accomplish this. In addition, BYU selected personnel to set up and operate the dairy equipment which Bigler had begun purchasing in early 1959 and had sent to the ADS near Jericho at Alami's request.

As early as December 8, 1959, Wilkinson had recommended Bigler to the ADS to be employed to oversee the dairy project development in Jericho. He also sent the names of Ralph Ashton and Eugene Drake.³⁷ Moreover, in early August Dr. Hallam, the Dean of the College of Biological and Agricultural Sciences at BYU before R. H. Walker's appointment, had given Bigler the assignment to help locate men to form a team of three to go to Jordan.³⁸ Ashton and Drake had been Bigler's selections to go with him as the poultry and horticulturalist experts.

Wilkinson had related to R. H. Walker before he made his recommendations to the LDS Church Expenditure Committee that Alami had

met and dealt with Bigler before Wilkinson had ever seen Alami.³⁹ Therefore, the restrictions recommended by R. H. Walker concerning the LDS Church donation presented a potentially volatile situation since Bigler had not been contacted nor consulted as to this major shift which would totally eliminate him and the men he had selected to go with him.

On November 23, 1960, seven days after Wilkinson received the official word that the funds by the LDS Church had been approved, R. H. Walker sent a letter to Bigler explaining the decision of the Church Expenditure Committee. The decision was the adoption of the recommendations by Wilkinson and R. H. Walker. He stated that the purpose for the decision was to promote a stronger and closer working relationship between faculty members of the two educational institutions. To accomplish these objectives it was the unanimous opinion of R. H. Walker, Wilkinson, et al. that a BYU faculty member should be given the responsibility of carrying out the work under the dairy cattle program.

The consideration of sending a BYU faculty member and his wife for at least two years and placing BYU in full control necessitated a drastic change in the plans which R. H. Walker and Bigler had discussed. Bigler was told for the first time that BYU had designated Seymour Mikkelsen as its representative on the dairy project. He and his wife were given the responsibility for selecting and purchasing the cattle and transporting them to Jericho. Mikkelsen was asked to serve as a member of the teaching faculty conducting classes in dairy cattle production, feeding, management, as well as the handling and processing of milk and milk sanitation at the boystown.

R. H. Walker apologized to Bigler for the major change in plans and he understood how disturbing and disappointing it would be to Bigler. Walker expressed his regret but said that the plans had to be changed to clarify the

responsibility and role of BYU in the dairy project. It was on this basis that the funds were made available. President Wilkinson expressed his deep and sincere appreciation for the interest and enthusiasm that Bigler had shown in the project. He felt that Bigler's contribution was very helpful in developing the dairy project at the boystown.

R. H. Walker desired to follow up with Bigler and Clark on the purchase and shipment of the dairy processing equipment. R. H. Walker had not been involved in any of the equipment procurement and had no idea of what had been done or what yet needed to be done. Therefore, Walker desired to meet with Bigler and Clark to get the details of what was yet needed to complete the dairy equipment phase of the project.⁴⁰

The recommendations by R. H. Walker created some misunderstanding with Alami and Bigler. Bigler told Alami in a letter that BYU had waited several days to tell him he was not going to Jericho. This was only seven days before he was to have left and he had been ready to leave since November 1. Bigler indicated he had spent \$1,600 in labor getting ready for the project, anticipating he would be paid with wages from the project when it got underway. Walker indicated he did not realize Bigler was so deeply involved in the project and he felt the University should send Bigler, even though they had arranged to send the Mikkelsens. R. H. Walker seemed to have favored Wilkinson's plan to eliminate Bigler from the project until he was confronted by Bigler. Then he changed back to favoring Bigler.⁴¹

R. H. Walker was playing politics. In one letter he was telling Alami that Bigler was not the dairyman to send and in another he was expressing his hope that it would be feasible for Bigler to travel with the Mikkelsens for assistance and support.⁴² R. H. Walker did not understand the relationship

Bigler and Alami had already developed. Alami sent a telegram to R. H. Walker stating his desire for Bigler and Hogan to come for six months and the Mikkelsens could follow for two years. Bigler had informed Walker and Alami that Mikkelsen had expressed his doubts as to whether he could install the equipment. Alami related this to Walker, and it was this statement by Bigler that promoted his preference for Bigler and Hogan. Bigler was promoting his aspiration, as was R. H. Walker.

Meanwhile, Alami wrote to Bigler stating that he was distressed to hear that BYU had decided to send Mr. and Mrs. Mikkelsen to start the dairy project and stay for two years. Alami understood that Wilkinson had informed Bigler of the new plan. Although Alami was disappointed that things turned out as they did, he wanted Bigler to know how much he appreciated him for his enthusiasm and labor put forth in the project. Alami also invited Bigler to travel to the project and stay as Alami's guest for any length of time, all at Alami's expense.

Alami told Bigler of a shipload of gifts which was going to Jordan sometime in May or June. It was possible that Alami could arrange for Mr. and Mrs. Bigler to travel aboard the ship. Alami said nothing would please him more than to have the Biglers go to Jericho. He stated that all the boys at the boystown had been looking forward to meeting Bigler because they had heard so much about his interest in their welfare. Alami said that this was no ordinary gesture, rather it was a sincere invitation to come to Jericho.⁴³

Wilkinson had called Bigler and told him to fire the men that he had lined up to go to Jericho—Ashton, poultry; Drake, horticulturalist. Wilkinson indicated he was going to hire his own men including a replacement for Bigler. Bigler was disappointed and hurt, but he knew that the project could go farther with BYU backing it.⁴⁴

The night after Wilkinson called Bigler, Mr. and Mrs. Mikkelsen went to see the Biglers and told them that Wilkinson had chosen them to go to Jericho. Mikkelsen and Bigler had been raised in the same Utah community, Fountain Green, and Mikkelsen did not want to go to Jericho if it meant hard feelings with Bigler. Mikkelsen knew that Bigler had worked hard in preparation for the project and Mikkelsen felt badly about the change of plans eliminating Bigler from going to Jericho to assist in starting the dairy. R. H. Walker also visited the Biglers to apologize for the change of plans. R. H. Walker informed Bigler that the Mikkelsens would be representing BYU since the funds were donated by the LDS Church through BYU. Bigler's wife, Hazel, was especially upset and both Mr. and Mrs. Bigler felt that they had been double-crossed by Wilkinson.

Meanwhile, Bigler and Hogan, a Utah dairyman, were still working on getting all the equipment purchased and shipped. Hogan and Bigler had spent two days with Dr. Morris of Utah State University at Logan, Utah making sure that all of the equipment was adequate and top of the line. Morris was considered to be the best authority in the country on processing milk and milk products. Bigler stated that most all the equipment had been selected and was on the way to New York City. The equipment and expenses at this point totalled almost \$22,000. This left approximately \$5,000 for additional purchases and shipping fees. R. H. Walker needed to buy the dairy stock to send to Jericho.⁴⁵

Eventually the decision was made to send Bigler with Mikkelsen in order to help get the project underway. Wilkinson had agreed to this as long as Alami paid Bigler's way. Walker stated that the Mikkelsens and Bigler were practically ready to travel and hoped that they could leave around the first of January 1961. On January 12, 1961, Bigler received the official word that he

was to accompany Mikkelsen to assist in the purchase of the dairy stock and in arrangement for their shipment to Jericho.⁴⁶

Purchase of the Dairy Cattle

The purchase of the dairy stock was finally getting underway after many months of thinking, planning and obtaining the funds. January 17 Bigler and Mikkelsen visited nearly all the dairies in Holland selecting the cattle. Then it was necessary to wait 26 days for the cattle to be assembled, vaccinated, and released by the government before they could be shipped. While making the purchase arrangements, Mikkelsen received a letter from Peter Dekker, a cattle dealer suggested by the Agricultural Attaché in Holland, who acted as a clearing house for the BYU dairy cattle purchasing committee, informing them that the best way to send the cattle would be by boat, especially since the insurance company had agreed to cover the risk of shipping the cattle not only to Aqaba but also by truck from Aqaba to Jericho. They also discovered that shipping the cattle by boat rather than by airplane would cost \$5,000, leaving much more money to buy cattle. Bigler called Alami in London to have him arrange for trucks to haul the cattle from Aqaba to Jericho.⁴⁷

Sixteen head of calves, ten bred heifers and one bull were purchased from various farms throughout Holland. Dekker took care of all the details for the preparation and shipment of the cattle to Jericho by steamship. The ship left Rotterdam in mid February, and the trip took 15 days.⁴⁸

While Bigler was in Holland he had sent a letter to President Henry D. Moyle stating that when he had been set apart in January 1961 as a missionary he was instructed to report directly to the First Presidency of the LDS Church. Wilkinson had arranged for Bigler and Mikkelsen to be set apart as missionaries in the event that they would have the opportunity to hold meetings or teach the gospel. This can be classified as a hidden agenda and it is apparent that most

projects entered into by the LDS Church have the underlying purpose of promoting public relations and missionary opportunities. In this letter dated January 27, 1961, Bigler had said:

I think it extremely wise that instruction be sent to Brother and Sister Mikkelsen regarding their personal conduct while in Jordan especially Sister Mikkelsen to put it bluntly she is very crude with her language—her habits and her dress. She goes around here in cowboy boots, pants and overalls and cowboy shirts. It's creating a false impression of our LDS women. She says she believes in being herself. I told her she should be better than herself and try to improve and not to do and say things that would cause regrets later. I told her to be cautious and not to do or say anything until she was sure of everything, to put her toe in the water before jumping in all over. It didn't seem to do much good. She told the waiter last evening the steer he served her was still belling. She is too familiar.

Her husband was with me when I tried to correct her and he didn't seem to mind one way or another how she acted, dressed or spoke. I make it a strict point to never be by her side alone or while we are walking. She is a good woman and means well I am sure. I don't want to give a wrong impression of her goodness and virtue—she needs strict council and I believe she would take it.⁴⁹

Upon receiving this letter President Wilkinson commented that it was evidence showing the wisdom for not having put Bigler in charge. It is not evident what Wilkinson's thinking was when he made this statement about Bigler, but if indeed Bigler's remarks about Mrs. Mikkelsen were true, then from an LDS or even an American image standpoint, Bigler had a valid concern which needed some attention.

Wilkinson turned this matter over to R. H. Walker and he drafted a letter to be sent to the Mikkelsens. In his letter Walker explained that most of the people in the Middle East are Muslims belonging to the Islamic religion. He suggested that they study the religion and culture of the people. This was necessary for them to understand the people better and to help them understand how they could best live and work with them. Walker stated that the Muslims respect Mormon people for their standards and beliefs, however, they forbid them to actively proselyte among them. Since the Mikkelsens were employed by

the ADS, Walker felt it better that they teach Mormonism only by setting a fine example by the way they lived. They would have to be patient and let the interested Muslims contact them to know more about their way of life and the religion which teaches it. When they approach the Mikkelsens then they could explain the gospel and what it does for the people.

Walker explained that visitors from the West to Jordan cannot always do things just as they are accustomed to doing them in the West. Muslim women for example have played a secluded role and even veiled their faces in the past. This and other customs need to be respected without trying to change them. Because of this Walker suggested that Mrs. Mikkelsen may need to be more reserved in the things she would do in Jordan than at home in the West. It was emphasized that it was important for an American abroad to remember that he/she is really representing America, and in the Mikkelsens' case they were representing the LDS Church as well.

About this same time Wilkinson had been informed that Mrs. Mikkelsen, before leaving Jordan, had expressed the desire to go swimming with the boys in Jericho. Wilkinson was concerned that this would be a breach of the native customs. He wrote to Alami asking him to properly advise Mrs. Mikkelsen on this point.⁵⁰

The Mikkelsens were encouraged to go to Amman and get in touch with officials of the United States Operations Missions and discuss with them the things that would help them understand the customs and culture in order to avoid problems. Walker stated that employees of the American Embassy and other United States government agencies are given rather extensive courses in orientation when they are assigned to a foreign country. This is a tremendous help for them to understand the people with whom they are working. This improves the relationships of the individuals as well as the countries as a whole.⁵¹

There was no further correspondence on this topic and Wilkinson was never informed whether the Mikkelsens ever followed R. H. Walker's advice to seek help from the American Embassy on matters of customs and religion.

The Mikkelsens and Bigler flew to Jerusalem and drove to the boystown. A couple of days after their arrival in Jericho, Norman Burns had the United States government publicity men there to get the full story about the cattle. They were going to meet the boat at Aqaba and take movies as the cattle were unloaded. This was to be published throughout the Middle East in Arabic and English. On February 27, 1961, Burns, some "Point VI" men, Mikkelsen, and men from the boystown went 250 miles south of Jericho to the port of Aqaba on the Red Sea to see the cattle arrive. They were accompanied by the international news reporter and the United States Information Service people.⁵²

Dairy Cattle Arrive at Aqaba

The ship, Mirna Lloyd, docked at 1:00 p.m., on Thursday, March 2, 1961, and by 5:00 p.m. the cattle had been loaded onto trucks. The cattle arrived in excellent condition and traveled the Aqaba highway to Jericho which was basically the same route which Moses and the Children of Israel traveled after crossing the Red Sea. It remains a true wilderness area. The trucks arrived around 5:00 a.m. the next morning at the project without incidents.

Bigler related that Jordanian, German, and American newspapermen had been at Aqaba and at Jericho. It was said by Bigler that this event had been the most gala affair Aqaba and Jordan had ever had. Bigler felt that he had been treated like a king and stated that Alami had told everyone that Bigler was completely responsible for the dairy being established in Jordan. Bigler was embarrassed when the Arabs saw him and met him, because they knew him from

the radio and newspaper reports. He felt that the cattle had really made news all over the Middle East.⁵³

An article in the Jerusalem Times carried the following headline: "U.S. Donates Jordan 27 Holstein Cattle."⁵⁴ The article explained that the funds for the livestock were contributed by the Mormon Church in Salt Lake City, Utah after Alami, President of the ADS, explained to President David O. McKay, President of the Mormon Church, the purpose of the farm and school and his desires to start a modern dairy. The article stated that the cattle had been purchased in Holland by Mr. Bigler, a prominent businessman in West Jordan, Utah, and Mr. Mikkelsen, Director of the Livestock Program at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah. Mikkelsen would remain in Jericho for two years to assist in the establishment and operation of the dairy.

The new modern dairy was to soon be producing sanitary dairy products for Jordan as well as give practical training to hundreds of boys working with the dairy cattle and manufacturing the dairy products.⁵⁵ In actuality, very few boys were interested in the dairy cattle and relatively few were trained to work with the cows and the milk processing equipment. Most of the boys were interested in wood and metal shop and culturally the women were the ones who took care of the animals.

Many people were enthusiastic about this dairy project. Among them was Norman Burns. Burns stated that he knew from experience that aid from one private organization to another was very effective because it goes directly from the people of one country to the people of another. He was proud that his countrymen from the State of Utah had developed on their own initiative this cooperative project with the ADS which was doing so much to improve the agricultural and rural life in Jordan.⁵⁶

Burns sent a letter to R. H. Walker informing him that Hugh Walker, Beirut representative of the Ford Foundation, and Cleon Swayzee, of the New York office of the Ford Foundation, were going to Jericho on March 6 to see Alami, Mikkelsen, and Bigler. Burns believed that the project was well underway, especially with the Mikkelsens staying with the project in Jericho to see it through the critical first year. He mentioned that the Ford people were as enthusiastic about the project as were Bigler and the Mikkelsens.

Bigler's enthusiasm is evident by his statement in a card to R. H. Walker dated March 1961 which stated that they (Bigler and Mikkelsen) were going to tell the world about the project.⁵⁷ However, President Wilkinson did not appreciate all the publicity the dairy project was getting through Bigler. He stated that the man had no discretion. Wilkinson had been holding off on the publicity, but he decided that maybe now they ought to release some articles on the dairy project.

Wilkinson was also concerned that Bigler was leaving Israel so soon. Bigler had informed Wilkinson that he was returning March 12. Wilkinson felt that he had barely arrived and he asked R. H. Walker if there was any reason at all for keeping him in Israel longer.

R. H. Walker had received a letter from Mikkelsen stating that he was well pleased with the project in Jericho. Walker, therefore, felt that it was the right time for a publicity item and that it was best to let Bigler return home as he had planned. His contribution had already been made, and there was no purpose for him to stay in Jericho any longer.⁵⁸

The letter which R. H. Walker received from Mikkelsen stated that the school and the whole ADS was an outstanding institution in the Middle East. In addition, Mikkelsen explained that there were 160 boys, several teachers,

businessmen at Jericho, and an office in Jerusalem. The help that was being sent could not be measured in money. Rather it is giving a way of life to an underprivileged people and they are responding in a positive way. Mikkelsen felt that Alami would be numbered among the great men of that day.

Moreover, Mikkelsen stated that March 10 was the first time that he was able to see the heifers together. They were very uniform in size and type. One would not suspect that they had come from eighteen different herds. The cattle were of very good quality, and three of them had come from the highest producing herds in Holland. Alami was most happy with the cattle. He had been to see the cattle four times that day showing them to important Jordanian officials.⁵⁹

Publicity Widespread

The dairy cattle project received a lot of attention. Many newspaper articles were published which described some of the details of the project. The United Press International in an article entitled "West Jordan, Jordan, owes a life long and life-saving debt to the citizens of West Jordan, Utah,"⁶⁰ by Zuhdi Sabah discussed the live-saving debt owed to the citizens of West Jordan, Utah by the citizens of that West Jordan, Jordan. They made it possible for the first modern dairy in Jordan. However, the whole ADS project came from the efforts of Musa Alami, a Palestinian who gave up his successful law practice in 1949 to begin a lonesome crusade. Alami tried to provide a home and education for hundreds of homeless boys. He tried to give them opportunities to learn, grow and restore their human dignity. This article was erroneous in the sequence of buying the cattle and then the dairy processing equipment. The equipment was bought and shipped to Jordan before the cattle were bought in Holland. In addition, the article was erroneous stating that Mikkelsen helped look for cows in America. He was only involved in selecting the cattle in Holland.

An article entitled "West Jordan Helps Mid-East Name Sake"⁶¹ was not written to President Wilkinson's liking. The article was written as if the dairy project was a West Jordan, Utah and Bigler project rather than a BYU project. The article was apparently written in the Middle East with the help of ideas and information from Bigler.⁶² President Wilkinson was upset that the publicity on the dairy project did not bill it exclusively as a BYU project. In a letter to Bigler Wilkinson stated that the First Presidency of the LDS Church had sent Bigler's letter to Wilkinson inasmuch as the dairy project was a BYU rather than a Church project.⁶³ Once Bigler was back home in Utah, Wilkinson felt better about the fact that he no longer had to deal with Bigler in the project. Likewise, Wilkinson wrote a letter to Hugh Walker expressing his desire to be kept informed of Mikkelsen's activities on the boystown project, whether they were critical or noncritical.⁶⁴

There had been additional talk of Hogan going to Jericho to install the equipment, and Alami sent Bigler a telegram asking if Hogan could arrive before Alami's departure from Jericho on May 14, 1961.⁶⁵ Mikkelsen wrote to Bigler expressing his frustration at the slow progress on building the milking parlor. Construction work just did not move as fast in Jericho as he was used to in the United States. The mangers had not been started, but the calf pens and maternity pens were finished and were really nice. Pictures of the milking parlor had arrived to show Alami how everything ought to fit together. Mikkelsen said it was difficult working with Alami, since he did not seem to understand how important it was to get the measurements exact.

All the equipment except the spare parts had arrived by April 25, 1961, but none could be installed until the milking parlor and processing plant had been completed. However, six cows had come fresh and the Arab boys were

learning to milk the cows. Mikkelsen stated that the Arab boys and the Dutch cows did not get along too well.⁶⁶

The alfalfa was growing well, except that it was harvested in an archaic manner. They were still using the scythe and carrying the dried alfalfa off the field by hand and loading it on a trailer and hauling it to the stack. Alami had had a harvester ordered, but he canceled it, hoping that someone would donate one to the boystown. Flies were another problem, and the sprays used were not very effective.

Mikkelsen Expresses Need for Equipment Mechanic

Mikkelsen and Alami discussed the dairy situation. Mikkelsen stated that Alami really needed Hogan in Jericho to set up the dairy equipment.⁶⁷ The floor was being poured in the milking parlor, and soon the processing floor would be poured. Mikkelsen needed Hogan to make a rough sketch for the arrangement of the equipment in order to know where the interior walls should be built.

There was enough milk from the six cows to feed the calves, and all the boys were getting pasteurized milk each morning at 9:00 a.m. Mikkelsen was delighted to see the boys drinking milk, and it made him feel as if his work at the boystown was most worthwhile.⁶⁸

While Mikkelsen was struggling to get the dairy set up, Alami made a visit to the United States. He went to Salt Lake City, Utah where Bigler held an open house in Alami's honor. George Johariya, the ADS Agriculturalist and Reem, Alami's secretary, accompanied Alami. R. H. Walker was also expecting Clark to take Alami to the BYU campus that Monday for an informal dinner with President Wilkinson and others he invited. R. H. Walker had invited Bigler to the dinner and he informed Wilkinson that Alami had apparently asked Bigler previously by letter to make arrangements for him while he was in Utah as well as following up on obtaining Hogan.

R. H. Walker felt that Alami had not fully understood the situation and events which had occurred the previous fall and winter. Walker presumably felt that Alami did not understand fully what had happened when the project shifted gears from Bigler to BYU. Walker wanted to clear up any possible misunderstanding about the shift in responsibility. It was Walker's belief that Bigler would understand without any ill feeling in the matter. Moreover, BYU wanted to clear up the matter so BYU could work directly with Alami rather than indirectly as their communications had been taking place.⁶⁹

Alami Expresses Gratitude to President McKay

Mr. Alami also had a meeting with the First Presidency of the LDS Church on June 27, 1961. Alami had been sick with a heart attack, but he told those at the meeting that before he did anything else, he had to come to Utah and pay his respects to President McKay and President Wilkinson for what they had done. Mr. Alami made this statement:

I feel, and I am saying it in all humility and sincerity, that the association with BYU, that the modest effort there has given us more courage and more hope than any gift or grants which have been made to us by either Point IV or the Ford Foundation or any other institution in England, and I will tell you why. All these other institutions give these grants; they may be big grants, we have a million dollars from the Ford Foundation, we get \$100,000 from Point IV, we get several hundred thousand of dollars from several other institutions in England. They were all given as part of their routine grants, but this gift of cattle with all that followed it was a gift from the heart and we feel that it came with love, and we feel that no gift and no cooperation can be effective unless it is coupled with love.⁷⁰

President McKay expressed his gratitude for Alami's sentiment and for his pleasure that the Church and BYU had pleased him and that the cattle had arrived safely.⁷¹

A month after Alami had visited Utah he asked again if BYU would proceed in getting a good man to install the dairy equipment and prepare the

processing plant for operation. He wanted someone who could stay at least a year. The individual's transportation and salary would be paid for by the ADS. The Ford Foundation had agreed to give the ADS help in getting this project accomplished.⁷²

LDS Church Donates Beef Cattle

About the same time Alami was asking for help to install the dairy equipment, he was asking for another donation from the LDS Church. This time there was talk of donating some beef cattle. President Wilkinson had spoken to President David O. McKay about the Church contributing some beef cattle. President McKay suggested that Wilkinson call Leo Ellsworth, manager of the LDS Florida cattle ranch to find out his suggestions. He told him that the Florida ranch could spare twenty to twenty-five heifers and a bull. Ellsworth said that this would only be a drop in a bucket. He recommended sending the Santa Gertrudis breed which is a cross between the Brahman and the Durham. He felt this breed would do much better in the Jordan climate. Wilkinson wanted a quick reply from President McKay if he was in favor of such a donation in order that Wilkinson could get in touch with Alami to arrange for the cattle to be delivered to a boat sailing from Florida the first part of September.⁷³

Mikkelsen's opinion about the feasibility of developing a small herd of beef cattle at the boystown was favorable. Mikkelsen was in favor of things that would enhance the educational program for the boys, but he was not interested in a large commercial project. He also felt that Alami only needed two men rather than the three that Alami had asked for. He felt a tropical fruit man and a farm mechanic were all that were needed. Mikkelsen mentioned that there was a lot of machinery at the school that was not being used for want of repairs.

Another month passed and Wilkinson still did not know whom they could send to set up the dairy equipment. Wilkinson did not feel Hogan was the best man because of his poor health and he wanted to find a man in better health.⁷⁴

On August 16, President Wilkinson received his answer from President McKay concerning the beef cattle donation to the boystown. The LDS Church leaders were in favor of the matter and President Moyle of the LDS Church First Presidency had called Ellsworth in Florida and asked him to make the necessary arrangements for shipping the beef cattle. Wilkinson was authorized to proceed with the project and he was to prepare a full report for the First Presidency concerning the number of cattle to be shipped and when they would be shipped.⁷⁵

The cattle were to be shipped by the World Friendship Organization under the leadership of Dr. W. O. Parr of Paduca, Kentucky. The cattle were to go as part of a large shipload of gifts to Jerusalem. Parr was about to obtain the funds to deliver the cattle to the ADS in Jordan.⁷⁶ Arrangements were also being made to ship the remaining necessary supplies and spare parts for the dairy plant on the World Friendship ship. The supplies were paid for by funds deposited in the Davis County Bank by Alami and sent to Pensacola, Florida.⁷⁷

In Jericho things were being prepared for the arrival of the beef cattle. Mikkelsen mentioned that Alami was disappointed that Parr would not be shipping some Jersey cattle and sheep along with the beef cattle. Mikkelsen felt that it was a good thing because there was not enough feed available on the boystown farm at that time. Mikkelsen, moreover, expressed optimism and enthusiasm about setting up the milking and processing equipment with the aid of local mechanics. Therefore, R. H. Walker said that they were giving up the idea of sending a special dairy mechanic to Jericho.

President Wilkinson had also been informed by a letter from David H. Hawkins, assistant manager of Deseret Farms of Florida Incorporated, that twenty head of Santa Gertrudis had been shipped to Jericho. Fifteen of them were two year old heifers, three were three year old heifers, one was a two year old bull and one was a four year old bull. Each animal had an individual number firebranded on the right hind quarter. Each heifer had been bred to an Angus bull to facilitate less difficulty in calving since Angus calves are smaller boned at birth.⁷⁸

In early January 1962, Alami informed Wilkinson that the beef cattle had arrived. The cattle were enroute for 52 days and one of the heifers had died for some unknown reason. One year had elapsed since Mikkelsen and Bigler had been in Holland and Mikkelsen was still struggling to set up the milking parlor and processing plant. Mikkelsen was wishing again that Hogan could be with him to help set up the equipment. Mikkelsen was happy with the rapid gains the Santa Gertrudis were making and he mentioned that there were now fifty-five head of cattle at the farm.⁷⁹

The Mikkelsen-Alami Conflict

Another personality conflict was that of Seymour Mikkelsen and Musa Alami. Once in Jericho, Mikkelsen came to realize that Alami was not much support. It was Alami's project, his boystown, and he had full control of what was to be done. If Alami did not agree with a proposal or plan, it was not implemented. Mikkelsen had a hard time getting things done and was never able to set up the milk processing equipment nor the milking parlor. Alami did not have much confidence in him. Part of Alami's lack of confidence in Mikkelsen, if the whole truth were known, may have extended from some ideas Bigler related to Alami by letter about Mikkelsen's own doubts of being able to set up the

equipment. Bigler was still hoping at that time that he and Hogan would go over to Jericho first and get the project underway.

The incompatibility of Alami and Mikkelsen had begun before Mikkelsen ever reached the project. Mikkelsen had not been prepared to deal with Alami's way of thinking and doing things. Alami had a feudal landlord mentality and Mikkelsen had assumed he would be free to go about the task of setting up the dairy as he saw fit. Wilkinson had not been aware of the true circumstances in which Mikkelsen was immersed. Moreover, Wilkinson did not know enough about Alami's disposition.

The working conditions and efficiency methods in Jericho were not what Mikkelsen was used to in the United States. He had many frustrating moments in trying to construct the building for the milking and processing equipment. Alami knew very little about the milking parlor and the processing equipment. Therefore, he did not understand the problems involved and he did not seem to be very cooperative in getting the materials, help, and equipment on site as they were needed. This human factor was detrimental in that sufficient support and understanding was not provided to Mikkelsen. The indirect reports Wilkinson was receiving about the Mikkelsens was also detrimental.

Hugh Walker's letter to Wilkinson of November 1961 is another example of indirect communication. Hugh Walker of the Ford Foundation in Beirut, Lebanon wrote to Wilkinson concerning the Mikkelsens. He did not give much detail but he felt that the Mikkelsens should be returned to the United States immediately. He understood that many things had gone wrong and Alami would have to explain later if he would. Hugh Walker had received reports from several people. One such person was an American who had just stopped by for a

short visit. He reported that all he heard were complaints. The Mikkelsens had been strongly supporting some of the people at the project according to H. Walker and it was these same people that H. Walker was trying to convince Alami he should dismiss from the project.

Moreover, H. Walker related that Jericho was a tough place to live and especially for women. He said he was sorry that the Mikkelsens had not enjoyed Jericho and he felt that his health had been a factor. Hugh Walker suggested that Wilkinson write to Alami for the details. However, H. Walker said that Alami would not take the initiative to write and explain the problem. Alami was just too kind hearted to do this and that was what got him constantly in trouble. Alami was afraid of hurting people's feelings but Walker said the situation just could not go on much longer.⁸⁰

A few days later, November 24, 1961, Wilkinson wrote a memorandum to R. H. Walker asking him to read a recent letter from Mikkelsen and evidently things were progressing well on the dairy project in Jericho. Wilkinson felt that Mikkelsen would do a good job if Alami would not become too impatient.⁸¹

Bigler also received some negative information about the Mikkelsens. Norman Burns had related that Reverend Hopkins had stopped by to see him and told him on a confidential basis that the Mikkelsens had become difficult to work with at the boystown. Reverend Hopkins stated that Mikkelsen was very good in the dairy end of the project, but he was delving into politics that was getting him into trouble. Reverend Hopkins had said that Mikkelsen had told the boys that they were slave labor and they should strike to get a wage or some sort of better financial benefits above their board and training. So the boys struck. The Jordanian staff kept it a secret from Alami for a few days, but eventually some of the boys were dismissed and Mikkelsen was told not to

concern himself with politics. In addition, Reverend Hopkins had understood that Mrs. Mikkelsen had gathered the Christian boys about her and expressed her feelings that they were mistreated or of a lesser importance than the Muslim boys. Reverend Hopkins said that Alami had the whole situation ironed out and it was for the best interest of the project that Mikkelsen confine himself to his own specialization. The political problems in the Arab world are too complex for outsiders to become involved in without getting into a lot of trouble. It was inappropriate for Reverend Hopkins to be the one to give a negative report on the project. Alami should have immediately reported to Wilkinson concerning problems on the project.

In spite of this, Mikkelsen continued to write as if nothing were wrong. He never mentioned the incidents spoken of by H. Walker or Burns. Mikkelsen merely explained that he had the milking stalls in and then stopped because the processing plant was not completed enough to install the bulk milk tank. He was optimistic about a brighter future and expressed that when the project was completed it would be the best set up he had ever been privileged to operate⁸² In addition, President Wilkinson mentioned that R. H. Walker had written to Alami concerning Mikkelsen's activity. R. H. Walker never received a reply; therefore, Wilkinson admonished Alami to answer him honestly and fully.⁸³ Alami did not reply to this request. However, Alami wrote and stated that some dairy processing equipment had been shipped along with the beef cattle but there was some question as to whether it had arrived. Dr. Parr, who was responsible for the ship and its contents, had no explanation to make, and Alami stated that Dr. Parr was a great disappointment to him.⁸⁴

H. Walker had received a copy of the letter Alami had sent to Wilkinson. The boxes of dairy equipment were checked and apparently

everything had been received. Moreover, R. H. Walker stated that it was apparently not uncommon for Alami to become upset and he felt that maybe this was the cause of the difficulty to which H. Walker had referred to in his letter about the Mikkelsens.⁸⁵ With the different sources of information, Wilkinson was in a dilemma as to what to say in a reply to Alami's latest letter.⁸⁶

R. H. Walker was asked by Wilkinson to draft a letter which he felt Wilkinson should send to Alami. They sent a pleasant assuring letter. Among other things it mentioned the hope of the project to continue developing and that the dairy and beef cattle would help give the boys the necessary training that Alami desired for them as well as to serve as the precursor of a good livestock industry for Jordan. The letter expressed that this type of project would make a great contribution to the welfare of the Arab people and Wilkinson and R. H. Walker were happy that BYU was able to participate in its development.

Meanwhile, Mikkelsen stated in a letter that he felt that Alami was seeing the need for a little advice on the dairy project. Alami seemed to have changed his attitude drastically about suggestions presented to him. Mikkelsen had been fearful for some time that his efforts for a workable relationship would be for nothing but he felt that his patience had been rewarded.

Mikkelsen at least knew what his task was and there was no problem as to having efforts duplicated because no one there, including Alami, knew how to properly construct the buildings for the dairy processing equipment. However, no one was appropriately asking about or listening to Mikkelsen's problems.

Just as the dairy project seemed to be developing satisfactorily, some more adverse events occurred. Reverend Hopkins, at a conference in Salt Lake City, spoke again of Alami's problems with the Mikkelsens. Hopkins urged BYU to alert Mikkelsen and have him get ready to return to BYU. Wilkinson wanted

to wait until Alami was in the United States to discuss the matter before making any decision. Hopkins stated to Wilkinson that Alami's official message was that Mikkelsen should be invited to return home before the hot summer season because of his health. Hopkins admitted that this was merely a diplomatic way of asking Mikkelsen to leave the project.⁸⁷

R. H. Walker had heard the same story from Hopkins two days prior to when Wilkinson was informed. Walker suggested that BYU concede to Alami's wish and bring the Mikkelsens home. However, he suggested that Alami continue Mikkelsen's salary until the end of August, yet allow Mikkelsen to leave earlier if the heat became too much for him. This would protect Mikkelsen financially.⁸⁸

Wilkinson asked in the letter if they could send any information or suggestions to Mikkelsen that would be helpful in his assignment. He mentioned again that they did not seem to have had a reply to the inquiry about the services of Mikkelsen. Wilkinson told Alami that he would appreciate a response from him.⁸⁹ Alami's reply to Wilkinson was that he would agree to any suggestion that Wilkinson would offer at any time. That was because, as Alami stated, he had been such a friend and supporter of the ADS and of Alami himself.⁹⁰

Wilkinson and R. H. Walker were sure that there were two sides to the problems Mikkelsen was having at the boystown and felt that Mikkelsen had done a good job looking after the cattle. This had been one of the major concerns before the dairy project was entered into by BYU. It was necessary to have someone supervise the cattle while they were adapting to the new climate and feed, and while the personnel at the school were learning how to care for the cattle. Regret was expressed by R. H. Walker that Mikkelsen was unable to set up the dairy equipment. There were several presumptions as to the delay but the equipment still needed to be installed and operated. R. H. Walker was sure

Mikkelsen could have done this if Alami would have given him the proper support.⁹¹ Up to this time R. H. Walker and Wilkinson still did not understand why the equipment had not been set up, but they never inquired of Mikkelsen to find out. They were relying on Alami.

In desperation R. H. Walker admonished Alami once again to answer honestly and fully concerning Mikkelsen's activities and finally Alami responded by telling R. H. Walker that he had installed an air conditioner in Mikkelsen's house and this had caused jealousy problems with the others. Even Alami did not have one because he did not want to receive any special treatment more than the others. He also stated that Mikkelsen had become isolated and did not communicate with the others. Alami certainly could be blamed for some of this behavior. Alami did not cooperate with him and the personnel would have followed Alami's lead in this type of behavior at Alami's request or by his example. Alami suppressed the channels of communications at will. He exacted a great deal of power over the project.

According to Alami, Mikkelsen had admitted to telling the five or six boys working with him that they should be paid. In addition, Alami did not feel Mikkelsen was competent to install the dairy equipment. He had attempted to install the central milking equipment but had to change it two or three times. Therefore, Alami did not let him install the other equipment. Alami also stated that he did not need the equipment at that time because of the low milk production. Even after stating these situations, Alami suggested that Mikkelsen could complete his term at the boystown but R. H. Walker felt that it would be better if Mikkelsen returned immediately with pay until September. Alami agreed to this.⁹²

Consequently, Wilkinson wrote to Mikkelsen stating that even though he had committed to stay at the boystown until January of 1963, it would be better for BYU if he would return and report for duty on the first of September. Wilkinson had told Mikkelsen that Alami had suggested that he stay until January but he had graciously consented to his return in the summer.

Wilkinson stated that Mikkelsen's health was a concern because he had learned of his bout with hepatitis and his heart attacks. Therefore, it had been arranged with Alami to compensate Mikkelsen until September by the ADS with the understanding that he could leave Jericho at any time in order to take full advantage of a vacation before arriving home for work in September.⁹³ Even Wilkinson was not being totally honest with Mikkelsen. He did not tell him of the indirect reports he received about Mikkelsen at the boystown nor did he ask Mikkelsen for opinion or explanation. He never told him the real reason why he was asked to report back to BYU six months early. Overall, Mikkelsen became the scapegoat for Alami's poor management practices and lack of knowledge of properly planning and setting up the dairy project. Alami's poor management practices were a concern to others such as Burns and McCowan of USAID.

Norman Burns had left the AID program in Jordan and became the President of the American University at Beirut by May 1962. He had expressed concern about Alami's managerial abilities with the project and funds. He felt Alami was a man of high integrity, but that his business procedures were sloppy. Dr. Burns stated that the greatest favor to Alami would be to loan him a person to improve the management of the project. There were those like Fared Imam that implied that Alami was living off the fat of the land. Alami was, in fact, very opposed to having an auditor do a thorough study of his records. A good business manager was needed at the ADS school to reduce the careless methods followed in the entire operation.

The Ford Foundation's relationship with Alami had been very good. They felt that Alami was one of the greatest men in the Middle East and they had much faith in his project. But even the Ford Foundation could see that more than new technology, Alami needed better business management.

President Burns mentioned that Alami had set up an advisory board of three members. Burns thought that the board needed to be strengthened and it should be encouraged to make decisions and be part of the policy development instead of leaving full power in the hands of one man. This was especially important, since Alami's health had not been very good in the past years. A board was needed that could function when Alami was not present at the ADS school and would add to more continuity when Alami became unable to function in his duties.⁹⁴

R. H. Walker had talked with Dr. Monroe McCowan, Chief of the Agricultural Branch for the Near East and South East Asia Bureau in the United States, Agency for International Development (AID) in Washington, D.C. and his assistant, Don Shallow. Walker's purpose was to obtain information about the AID-ADS relationship. The working relationship between the AID and the ADS had been handled by the Educational Branch in AID. During Walker's conversation with McCowan he learned some ideas which seemed to reflect AID's attitude toward the ADS school. McCowan was not sure what Alami was teaching the boys, he did not know what kind of organized program Alami was running nor if the boys would be properly trained to find jobs when they graduated. McCowan seemed to feel that something was lacking in the boys' curriculum and training. Also, there was no placement program for the graduates.⁹⁵

McCowan suggested in June 1962 that BYU make a thorough study of the ADS if it contemplated any additional help to the ADS. The study ought to encompass the educational objectives and procedures as well as the management and operations. This study should have been undertaken before BYU became involved. Even the Ford Foundation and USAID should have studied the Alami boystown more carefully.

In addition, the AID was then conducting an audit of the business operations. Meanwhile, Garland Hopkins, then the Secretary General of the World Fellowship of Moslems and Christians and contributor to the Alami Foundation in New York, had called R. H. Walker wanting to know if the LDS Church was planning any additional help to the ADS. It was evident that Hopkins had not been successful in obtaining other help for the ADS; therefore, they were looking to the LDS Church as a promising prospect for support.

Walker asked Hopkins if Alami would favor BYU sending a faculty member to the ADS to study the curriculum and management of the school. Hopkins replied that it would be favorable if BYU just studied how it would better relate to the support of the project. However, to study the management and operations of the ADS school would not be approved. Hopkins stated that AID had made a survey in the fall of 1961 and reported that the ADS school was more successful than its own AID supported school.⁹⁶ The ADS was Alami's show and he would run it his way. All he wanted was the funds to do so without any strings attached. Alami was not the only one with management problems, Wilkinson did not use enough resources to learn the details of Mikkelsen's problems at the ADS. A better support and communication system for Mikkelsen was needed but never implemented.

Mikkelsen's Advocate

Mikkelsen was having a trying time at the boystown. Hugh Walker and Garland Hopkins had been sending Wilkinson some adverse reports about the Mikkelsens, but Mikkelsen also had a seemingly unbiased advocate—a news columnist for the Chicago Tribune named Tom Dammann. Mr. Dammann and his wife had gone to Aqaba to greet Dr Parr's "Friend Ship." It was there that Dammann met Mikkelsen and arrangements were made for Dammann to go to the boystown near Jericho for photographs to be used in conjunction with an article he was working on concerning contributions such as the beef cattle to Jordan. He went to Jericho taking the two Future Farmers who had accompanied and cared for the cattle across the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

Mr. Dammann introduced himself to Alami, but was told he did not have time to talk to him in a most insulting manner. Dammann explained that he was an American newspaper correspondent anxious to tell the story of American help to Alami's countrymen. Alami was quoted as saying in an explosive way, "You can take it all back home with you right now."⁹⁷ as he waved his hand toward the truckload of tools and equipment.

Dammann later learned from others that Alami would frequently express himself in irrational outbursts. However, since he was doing such a great work for his people, he refrained from printing this happening in his article. Instead, he related this incident to R. H. Walker as a testimony that the Mikkelsens were under very trying psychological conditions. He continued by stating that this fact could be confirmed with the American Consulate in Jerusalem, and that the Mikkelsens' patience, understanding, and dedication which they displayed each day, was something all Americans would be proud of.⁹⁸ This adverse information about Alami was related to Wilkinson, who

expressed no objection to R. H. Walker's sending a copy of Dammann's letter to Hugh Walker in Beirut for his reply on Dammann's comments about Alami.

From Mikkelsen's perspective, things were going pretty well in February, 1962. There was no real rush to get the parlor and processing plant set up since there were only thirteen cows producing.⁹⁹ This small number of cows would not produce enough milk to warrant operating the large expensive milking parlor, nor would the small volume of milk be sufficient to even start up any processing equipment. Between the baby calves and the boys, the fresh milk was readily consumed.

Mikkelsen's Return to Provo

Wilkinson had expressed his deight to Mikkelsen that BYU had been instrumental in establishing an outstanding herd of cattle for the ADS, even though the dairy equipment did not get installed.¹⁰⁰ The Mikkelsens returned to Provo, Utah the latter part of July.

Even before Mikkelsens return to BYU, Wilkinson wrote to Alami inquiring if BYU should attempt to locate a man to take Mikkelsen's place.¹⁰¹ Ten days later, Walker received a call from Frederick Thomas of the Ford Foundation stating that Alami had called asking them to send someone to set up the dairy equipment. Mr. Thomas was just checking to find out if Alami had made any conflicting arrangements with BYU before he would proceed in trying to find someone for the job.¹⁰² This was an intelligent move. Evidently Mr. Thomas knew Alami well enough to know that he asks everyone for the same thing and persists until someone supplies what he asks for.

Wilkinson raised the issue that the equipment deal was actually set up through Bigler and BYU was not directly responsible except that at one time, when Alami was in Provo, BYU did offer to help get someone to set up the dairy

machinery. Therefore, Wilkinson still wanted to help get the processing plant operational.¹⁰³

Smoot Hired to Set Up the Dairy Machinery at ADS

Finally, after months of trying to locate a suitable person to send over to the ADS to set up the equipment, Neldon Smoot, who operated a small farm similar to the ADS with his father in Centerville, Utah, was selected.¹⁰⁴ Wilkinson was happy to find out that the Ford Foundation had assumed the financial obligations for the work. He assured Alami that BYU and the General Authorities of the LDS Church had a deep interest in the work which was being done by the ADS and they were very anxious to see the school grow and develop in order to continue serving the young boys of Jordan and other areas in the Middle East. They had confidence that the program of training would do a great deal toward the development of the young men and their eventual contribution to the welfare of the Arab people.¹⁰⁵ Alami replied to Wilkinson's letter stating that he would never forget his personal enthusiasm and interest in the project and the warm support of President McKay. Without them there would not have been a dairy farm in the Jordan Valley. Alami said he would be forever grateful to all involved in bringing the project to fruition.¹⁰⁶

The Smoots arrived January 1963 in Beirut. Hugh Walker of the Ford Foundation had told Neldon that it was his job to get the dairy plant operating so Alami could market the products in Jerusalem and Amman and eventually make the project self-sustaining. He went to Jericho with that intent.

Mr. Smoot stated that the school was one of the most terrific things he had seen.¹⁰⁷ He felt that someone had done a great job in teaching the boys how to care for the livestock and that Johariya had done a fine job in managing the cattle. Smoot was very complimentary to Mikkelsen, praising his work at the

ADS even though he did very little with the equipment. Mikkelsen was also highly respected by Johariya and the boys. He related that the cows were in excellent shape, the breeding program was fine, there was plenty of good hay, and excellent grain ration. The milk production was good, and the calves were healthy and growing well. They had just begun using a fine bull that was born just when the cows had arrived at the ADS. A good disease prevention program had been followed, especially for hoof and mouth disease. Smoot had started immediately to uncrate and inventory the equipment with the help of the boys. Everything seemed to be there with a couple of minor problems, but he was confident that they could be worked out. He was excited about the fine building that had been built to house the equipment. Smoot felt that the plant would "be one of the finest and most up to date plants in the world of its size"¹⁰⁸ after they got the equipment installed. He told R. H. Walker that he could be proud of his part in the project and that the efforts of the LDS Church were greatly appreciated by the Arab people.¹⁰⁹ Bigler received a letter from Smoot praising him for the excellent job he had done in obtaining such fine equipment. Smoot noted that the dairy plant building was of white tile with a beautiful marble floor. He was sure he could have the plant operating within two months and he was enjoying working with the boys who already were calling him uncle.¹¹⁰ Everything went well for a month or two, but then it began to be clear to Smoot that Alami did not care if the project was self-sustaining.

In mid-March, 1963, Alami wrote telling Wilkinson that he was very happy with the Smoots and that the equipment would take at least eight to ten weeks more before the processing plant would be in full operation because of small things missing and because some of the electric motors were not wired properly for the electrical power system in Jericho. He also stated that the

Santa Gertrudis were not doing well and they were costly to raise. Smoot and other dairy experts, British and Arab, recommended that they sell the beef cattle and buy Holsteins.¹¹¹

Lola Smoot, wife of the late Nelson Smoot, stated that her husband had a hard time getting anything done. The Arab workers were independent and did things the way they wanted to. The process of getting anything done was very slow compared to the way he was used to working. When Smoot wanted to get something done he would go to Reem Hamameh, Alami's secretary and right hand person. Reem knew relatively everything and was very helpful to Smoot.¹¹²

Hugh Walker of the Ford Foundation had not been very helpful to Smoot. He always sided with Alami. This was a detriment to Smoot and hampered his ability to achieve the goal Hugh Walker had given him when Smoot arrived in Beirut. The milking parlor and processing plant was a million dollar show place, but it was not practical to Smoot. The project was one to get money and H. Walker would play into Alami's hands for it the best he could. Alami and Hugh Walker both had their motives, but it was hard for Smoot to understand why so much money was wasted. The fact that the boys were not working much and were only attending their classes bothered Smoot. He felt the boys could learn to do more work and save the boystown a lot of money rather than hire other Arabs to do the work.¹¹³

Hugh Walker was a loyal supporter of Alami's project and Alami gathered support from all who would give. This made the control of the management at the ADS very difficult. Because Hugh Walker had never lived at the project for a long period, he was not in a position to understand the problems and could not make clear decisions regarding it. Instead he merely followed Alami's lead and requests.

It was reported that the calves born and raised on the ADS farm were in demand in Jordan and other parts of the Arab World. The ADS was selling as many as they could spare at a moderate price and there was much room for expanding the dairy operation.¹¹⁴ Selling the heifer calves when Alami needed more cows to build an economical unit to run the milking parlor and processing plant at its completion made little sense. Alami would sell the calves and at the same time be pleading for more donations of cows and/or money.

The facts that the project was incomplete and not self-supporting were used as excuses for Alami to raise more funds from different organizations. One day George Johariya, the farm superintendent, told Alami that Smoot had instructions to make the dairy economically stable and even profitable. Alami was quoted as saying he would straighten out Smoot's thinking. Alami argued that selling the milk was depriving the boys of milk. Smoot stressed that there was a surplus of milk which could be sold without jeopardizing the boys' daily consumption of milk. Alami had disagreed and from that point on "...Musa did everything he could to frustrate the completion of the dairy project."¹¹⁵

Smoot felt that Alami deliberately left some of the bottling equipment in customs for over two months until he told Alami that he had better cooperate with him or else he would report Alami's conduct to the Ford Foundation. It was only two days later that the bottling equipment had been released and delivered to the project. Smoot said this was typical of Alami's conduct during the year Smoot had worked there. "In fact," said Smoot, "I probably never could have gotten the dairy going if it had not been for the fact that Musa was sick from March until November, 1963, and it was during this period that I really got the job done."¹¹⁶

Moreover, Smoot said he had noticed many times that when important people, who could supply Alami with additional funding, visited the dairy, Alami would arrange everything so that the project would look incomplete. Smoot gave one example in which he returned one weekend to find that Alami had upset the whole dairy plant. This had been after Smoot had completed the plant and had it in operation. Another time he had unplugged the ice cream freezers, stacked supplies from the store room on the processing room floor, and did other things to make the plant look unfinished. Smoot was surprised and had asked Alami what he was doing, but Alami's only response was that he would tell him later. As soon as the boys left who were helping Alami put things in disarray, he informed Smoot that some important people were coming and he wanted the place to look incomplete.

Smoot felt that Alami's attitude and conduct toward the dairy project was also reflected in his management of the farm. Smoot had seen four acres of lettuce left uncultivated and unweeded. Alami had made no attempt to save the crop even though he had 160 boys who could have helped. The lettuce crop became a complete loss.

Termination of BYU's Involvement in the Project

When Smoot left on December 7, 1963, he was under the impression that Alami no longer had an interest in the project except that it was a guise for obtaining money. Smoot could see that Alami was a poor manager. He had talked with Arabs and Americans who had worked with Alami and had seen his operation. They too felt that he was wasteful in the use of funds given to him.

Smoot stopped to visit the Ford Foundation office in New York on his way home from the ADS to tell them his story. The Ford Foundation people seemed happy to see him and they told him that when they had sent him over to

Jericho they really did not expect that he could get the dairy in operation. The Ford Foundations' long experience with Alami gave them a great deal of reservation as to whether the dairy project would ever be completed. They had felt that the obstacles at the ADS farm were more than any man could overcome. Smoot had related to Harvey Hall of the Ford Foundation that Alami had given him a lot of problems but that he was determined to put the plant into operation as he had promised.

It would seem that some personnel in the Ford Foundation were strong supporters of Alami and the ADS but others had a different perspective. The Ford Foundation would donate large sums of money to Alami even though they knew he was a poor manager. They felt he was a great man but did not try to help him improve his management practices. They seem to just get along with him with little concern about the cost or waste. The Ford Foundation personnel in New York did not bother to inform Smoot of the possible obstacles he would encounter at the ADS. They let Smoot find out for himself. This is a weakness of human nature and poor management.

In January, 1964, Smoot was in R. H. Walker's office at BYU to report on his work at Jericho. He stated that the dairy project was in excellent condition and operating well. Of the original 26 head of dairy animals, two had died and 24 were in production. When Smoot left the project on December 10, 1963, there were 26 cows producing and the total number of dairy animals was nearly 70. During 1963, about 18 head of young bulls had been slaughtered for meat since they were not needed in the breeding program. The meat was used by the school. Alami had received another gift of 32 young heifers from Holland in 1963. The source was unknown to Smoot but presumably they came from funds raised in England.

Smoot reported that the milk processing equipment had been assembled and had been in operation for six months. The mechanized milking machines had been in operation since May of 1963. The pasteurizing equipment had been started in the summer and Smoot even made some ice cream which was used at the school. The bottling equipment was set up and operating by November 1963, and the milk was being sold in Jerusalem and Amman. In effect, then, the dairy plant was in full operation at the time Smoot left Jericho at the end of the year.

Smoot's hope was that Alami would keep the people he trained at the dairy so that the plant would remain in full operation and more boys could be trained. He added that it took several months to get the equipment operative simply because not all of the equipment was at the project, several months elapsed before some of the equipment arrived, especially the bottling equipment and bottles.¹¹⁷

In addition to Smoot's report, which R. H. Walker sent to President Wilkinson, Walker stated that he was grateful for the privilege of representing BYU and the LDS Church in the development of the dairy project and he was very pleased with the success which it had. Moreover, he appreciated the contributions which had been made by Mikkelsen and Smoot.¹¹⁸

BYU's direct involvement in the ADS dairy project was virtually over when Mikkelsen returned to Provo in the summer of 1963. However, BYU was involved in the procurement of Smoot to set up the equipment and operationalize the plant. Therefore, BYU was indirectly involved until January 1964. The dairy had been set up and functioning with men trained to carry on the full dairy operation from feeding and caring for the cattle to the packaged dairy products. One would think that the project would be set for great success and an

extremely great asset to the ADS school. However, over the following months and years many problems were to appear.

The major issue was the constant search for funds or donations of cattle or equipment. Wilkinson and Bigler remained involved with the project for years by virtue of their membership on the Advisory Board of the Musa Bey Alami Foundation based in New York. Alami occasionally asked Bigler for more help through the years.

In 1965, Smoot had written to Johariya, the farm superintendent, at the ADS telling of his plans to conduct a tour to the Holy Land. He had also written to Ronny, a young Dutchman who had worked with him on the dairy. Johariya did not reply; however, Ronny had written explaining that everyone on the project was told that if Smoot returned to the project he would not be allowed to enter. This puzzled Smoot because he had felt good feelings from everyone and even Johariya had told him he had done a good job. In addition, Ronny stated that the Dutch government was no longer granting any money for the project because of Ronny's report on Alami's poor management.

As Smoot continued to wonder why Alami would not allow him on the project, he recalled a conversation he had had with Dr. Hopkins, the representative of a Christian Church organization which had been donating money to the project. Hopkins had talked with Smoot when he first arrived at the project in Jericho and "...still under the spell of Alami's charm."¹¹⁹ Smoot had asked Hopkins what would happen to the project if Alami died and Hopkins replied, "This project would go much better."¹²⁰

Smoot said he did not have anything personally against Alami but he had no confidence in him as a manager. He felt Alami was highly egotistical and Smoot felt a little hurt that Alami never gave the LDS Church even a little

credit for their part in the dairy project. Nor did he give the Ford Foundation any credit and they had to insist that plaques be put on some of the buildings which they had built for the school. Alami had also been very critical of Mikkelsen when Smoot would refer to him, and yet Smoot felt that Mikkelsen had done a tremendous work when he had been there.

It was Smoot's contention that the project had great possibilities, but only under new management. The project needed someone who understood farm management in order to properly keep the ground fertilized and producing good crops. The water had to be pumped, and it was expensive to do so; therefore, greater efficiency was needed to offset the cost of production. Hugh Walker of the Ford Foundation in the Middle East had mentioned to Smoot that the Jericho Valley could put a million dollars worth of fresh strawberries on the European market at Christmastime if the area could be properly developed.¹²¹

The people working for Alami agreed that he was a charming and persuasive person. The complaints about him were his tactics and the poor methods he used in management. Mikkelsen and Smoot had complained that Alami had constantly tried to frustrate their work towards completion of the processing plant. They both agreed that Alami would dress up the project when he wanted to impress others with his accomplishments and then turn right around and undress it and make it look unfinished when he wanted to impress the people who would sympathize with him and grant him more money or give their support in obtaining more grants.

Personal conversations with Amer Salti, Shahadeh Dajani, both past managers for the ADS farm., Wahib Tarazi, (veterinarian); Mikkelsen and Lola Smoot indicated that Alami was hard to work with. Everything had to be done his way without exception. Salti had no freedom to use his own ingenuity as the

manager over all operations. He felt Alami's methods of management were archaic and after three months decided to leave his management position for the sake of their friendship. Tarazi, likewise, had problems in working with Alami to improve the dairy herd, the milk production, and the butter fat content. Dajani, also felt that Alami was good at getting money but not in making money. This implied that Alami's charm and diplomacy aided him in getting funds but the management of the money and the farms were poor.

Misgivings and Discrepancies in Reports

During the two years that BYU was directly involved in setting up the dairy project there were no apparent misgivings about the project. However, a few years later some discrepancies in reports came to Wilkinson's attention concerning problems which Mikkelsen and Smoot had had with Alami and his management of the boystown. Wilkinson asked Cleon Skousen, who was a faculty member at BYU and had visited the ADS boystown on at least two different occasions and had reported to Wilkinson on his findings in late 1966, to review Wilkinson's ADS files and report his findings. His reports came from the Alami Foundation in New York, from Alami himself, and from the Ford Foundation. All these people were very supportive of the ADS dairy project and were constantly reporting optimistic facts to bolster more interest and/or for fund raising purposes as is the case of the Alami Foundation and Alami himself. The reports were biased and represented a skewed view of the ADS project.

Skousen spoke with Mikkelsen and Smoot and found that they had many problems at the ADS boystown which were never reported to Wilkinson. Like Skousen, they were hesitant to report anything negative about Wilkinson's "BYU-ADS" dairy project. Wilkinson only asked for the positive aspects of their experience. He seemed to set the tone for what information was expected and

Mikkelsen, Smoot and Skousen seemingly wanted to please Wilkinson with the correct replies. Wilkinson evidently intimidated the people he was associated with.

W. Cleon Skousen had been at the ADS project in October of 1966 and had been requested to furnish President McKay and his counselors with a report of his findings. A source of Skousen's information came from Fareed Imam, a friend of King Hussein of Jordan. Imam handled most of the official tours of Jordan for the king.

Skousen had visited the Holy Land for the first time in 1962 and had seen the farm and dairy project which Alami had been developing. It was said to have been a great and growing operation. At that time he mentioned that some of the Mormons were helping to supervise the project and he was greatly impressed by the entire project.

On other trips to the Holy Land, Skousen had asked Imam to take his tourist groups, which he was directing, to the Alami project, but Imam refused. In October of 1966 Skousen insisted that Imam take his group to the ADS dairy and after much argument Imam said that he wanted to avoid the project because it was then poorly managed. However, he took them to see the dairy project.

At this time, the project was quiet and not many people were around. One of the workers near the dairy had gone to announce the group's arrival to Alami but the individual returned and stated that Alami was not there. Skousen and Imam then walked back towards the pens and sheds which were practically empty. Imam talked in Arabic to one of the Arabs who was working there and he reported that many of the cows had died of disease.¹²²

Skousen and Imam had started back toward the bus when Alami unexpectedly came out of his house. Evidently he was embarrassed to find

anyone still there. Imam talked with Alami in Arabic. They became rather excited and later Imam related to Skousen that Alami had given him a severe tongue lashing. Imam had also related to Skousen that Alami was not honest with President McKay.

He has exploited this project to his own advantage. He hurts the image of the people of Jordan. I am glad President McKay and the Church are no longer giving him any help. He has been putting a lot of money in his own pocket. Now you know why I was ashamed to take you to the project.¹²³

Wilkinson was irritated that Skousen had not told him this information in October of 1966 since he ". . . was the one responsible for the Church helping Alami in the first place, I would have thought that out of courtesy you would have told me about it."¹²⁴ The information that Wilkinson was getting from Skousen was at variance with all the other reports he had received. In addition, Wilkinson received a letter from Smoot telling of his difficulties with Alami. Wilkinson did not know what to do about this new contrast in the recent reports he had received. He was still awaiting Skousen's evaluation of a letter from Kennett Love, a member of the Alami Foundation in New York who had written a report on his trip to the ADS.¹²⁵ The letter Smoot had sent to Wilkinson was in reply to Wilkinson's desire to get to the bottom of the discrepancy in opinions and facts about the Alami project. Smoot said he had wanted to talk to someone about the situation for sometime because when he returned he was asked to report on his "accomplishments" and he never was able to express the "problems" he had encountered.

Smoot concluded in his written report that his comments were not intended to discourage further help by the LDS Church of the development of the region. His major concern was that the funds be used efficiently for good purposes and not wasted as he felt it had been to some extent in the past. Smoot

related to Wilkinson that he knew many other details that he could share if Wilkinson wanted additional information. Smoot reiterated that when he returned from Jericho he was asked to give just a short report.¹²⁶

Wilkinson wrote to Smoot, thanking him for his additional information but expressing regret that the difficulties with Alami had not been reported sooner. Wilkinson acknowledged that Smoot's letter helped him know how to proceed with further activity. Moreover, Wilkinson said that most of his and BYU's dealings had been with Bigler, who had always been enthusiastic about Alami, and he asked whether Smoot knew of any reason why Bigler continued to be so enthusiastic.¹²⁷

On February 7, 1968, Cleon Skousen reported by letter to Wilkinson concerning the material he had sent him on the ADS. Skousen commented that the reports Wilkinson had given him had been very positive and enthusiastic about the project under Alami's management. He, therefore, understood Wilkinson's surprise with Skousen's report. It was apparent to Skousen that the reports coming from the ADS were based on what people had been told by Alami and his close assistants. The information which the reporters recorded was only that which was given to them at the time of their visit to the ADS and not their own personal knowledge. That was true especially in the case of Kennett Love. Again, it was apparent to Skousen that Love quoted statistics which also appeared in the yearly ADS report for 1967. Smoot had stated to Skousen that the statistics were highly suspect. An example Smoot gave was that the 1967 report gave the ADS credit for providing the help and experience which culminated in the reclamation of 50,000 acres in the Jordan Valley. However, Alami had been very jealous of his ADS operation and had refused to share any information or experience with other Arabs in the area. In addition, Smoot

related that in 1963 the total acreage that had been brought under cultivation by well water was only 4,600 acres and he doubted that much more had been developed since.

In 1967 the ADS yearly report and Love's report stated that there were 430 and 450 cows respectively and 12,000 chickens before the 1967 war. Smoot stated that this was literally impossible because the project did not even have the facilities to handle that many livestock. Even the claim that the annual report made concerning the sale of produce before the 1967 war was not accepted by Smoot. He felt the \$140,000 figure was grossly exaggerated. When Smoot was operating the dairy at its peak just before he left the project, he said that Alami would not allow the project to make \$25,000 from the sale of all the produce even though he could have done so. Smoot stated that Alami had consistently kept the farm dependent on outside funds. Mikkelsen added that while he was there, Alami had ploughed up a whole crop of truck gardening and justified it by saying that it was necessary because of the loss of markets. Even some of the employees became very angry. They felt that Alami could have made the produce available to the refugees even if he did not want the crop harvested and sold on the market. Mikkelsen then proceeded to explain that as soon as the crops were ploughed under Alami immediately set out to raise more funds stating that a loss of crops necessitated increased funds to keep the project alive. This resulted in the resignation of one of the foremen.

Alami had visited Utah in March of 1966, and while there Smoot had spoken with him. Alami had told him that the Ford Foundation had stopped all grants to the ADS project. The Ford Foundation, however, in the fall of 1966, according to the 1967 ADS report, donated \$430,000 earmarked for the dairy. These funds were allocated at about the same time Skousen was at the dairy.

Skousen pointed out that the 1967 report claimed that the 1967 war had greatly damaged the project and that it would take three years to rebuild it. The Love report of December 1967 stated that the damage of the war could no longer be detected even by himself who had been acquainted with the farm for fifteen years. It was Smoot's opinion that the claimed losses and destruction had never really occurred. The 1967 ADS report of having 430 cows and Love's report of 450 cows, according to Smoot, was misleading and not made in good faith.¹²⁸

With this new variant information, Wilkinson asked his administrative assistant, Dean A. Peterson, to study through all the material and correspondence Wilkinson had about the ADS and prepare a summary of his findings. Wilkinson had also been asked by Alvin R. Dyer, representing the First Presidency of the LDS Church, to give a full report on the matter. Wilkinson stated that he would resign from Alami's Advisory Committee if anything was found that proved things were not as Alami had said they were.¹²⁹

Peterson did not come up with any new profound insights; he merely summarized the data and ideas contained in the letters and reports given to him by Wilkinson. He did, however, talk with R. H. Walker and Amer Salti, an orphan from the ADS, about the project and Walker indicated that the project was a great humanitarian attempt even though the project was falling far short of its potential.

Nothing was found which stated that Wilkinson resigned from Alami's advisory committee but research in Israel revealed even greater discrepancies than those mentioned by Skousen and Smoot. Alami's post 1967 war report on the "Present and Future of the ADS" stated that the farm suffered most, for several days the cows and chickens went almost entirely without food and water

and there was no veterinary care available. As a result, according to Alami, about 60 percent of the cows and poultry either died or had to be slaughtered. Out of 430 cows only 170 remained and of the 12,000 chickens only 4,000 survived. All of the remaining cows and chickens were in pretty bad shape and needed to be replaced as soon as possible.

The alfalfa fields had been left without irrigation for six weeks and only 20 percent of the fields survived, leaving only 40 acres of the 200 acres that were still producing.

Alami stated that only two of the sixteen wells were operating after the war. The pumps and engines were destroyed or damaged and the trucks and tractors were either stolen or damaged. The electric generator broke down allowing the products in cold storage to spoil which was a loss of several thousand pounds sterling. The dairy plant was damaged and inoperable.¹³⁰

Alami had not even been at the boystown during the 1967 war. He was out of the country and was unable to return. Moreover, Tawfiq Hussain, an instructor at the ADS, in a newspaper article dated July 24, 1967, was quoted as making a statement very contrary to what Alami had stated about the farm destruction. Hussain had said, after the 1967 war "The Israel Army was most cooperative. The soldiers helped us in the first hard days of the war, and no damage whatsoever was done. There were 300 head of cattle and a huge poultry run."¹³¹ He complained, however, of the difficulties of marketing their products and the farm manager had stated that "During the six days war, the farm had been unscratched . . ." ¹³²

Sir Geoffrey Furlonge, the former British Ambassador to Amman and author of "Palestine is My Country—the story of Musa Alami" had stated that "all vehicles had been taken and many of the houses looted" during the 1967 war

but Mr. Salah had refuted this in a newspaper article dated May 30, 1969. He also denied the allegation that he had "'..wrestled with local Israeli officialdom to obtain necessary permits,' and that 'Israeli tanks had put all but two wells of the farm out of order.'"¹³³

In an interview with Mr. Salah in Jericho, Israel (West Bank) 1983, he stated that Alami was upset with him for having kept the farm in such a fine state after the 1967 war. This is understandable if Alami was spreading propaganda of the devastation during the 1967 war. One could surmise that Alami was seeking sympathy for fundraising purposes.

If these statements by Tawfiq and Salah are true then a conference held by the ADS in Jerusalem in April of 1973 for the purpose of appealing to the Israeli authorities to repair and replace the damages and losses which occurred to the ADS in the six days war was a farce. The conference had been attended by United States and British supporters of the ADS.¹³⁴

There were many other reports on the number of cows at the boystown dairy which were highly suspect. Over the years the number of head seemed to become more exaggerated. The discrepancies learned by Wilkinson and those discovered since tends to leave one with many misgivings as to the intent of Alami and others by printing many so called facts with such frequency and magnitude of discrepancy.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE STUDY

In the case of the ADS-BYU bilateral aid project, BYU found itself in a peculiar situation. It did not look at a proposal and weigh the facts and then select the project. The project seemingly selected BYU. It was the individuals—Wilkinson, Clark, Bigler, President McKay, President Moyle, and others—whose influences in the right places provided the funding which selected BYU to administer it. It was the individuals who became interested out of the humanitarian appeal of the orphan refugee boys. Each of the individuals had good intent, but their research and planning was insufficient. It was after the individuals became involved that the problems began to unfold and the subsequent resolution.

Human factors such as personality conflicts, misunderstandings, and management problems were very significant issues in BYU's involvement in the ADS dairy project, as were communication problems and cultural conflicts. There were also misgivings as to Alami's intents and purposes for the aid he received.

The case study will be analyzed according to the principles stated and discussed in chapter two to show what the project did and did not do.

1. Base the project planning on careful analysis of factual situations.

There was a great short-coming in understanding the receiver's culture and methods of administration. The situation at the boystown was not

studied well. The objective of building a dairy and milk processing plant was presented by Alami and it seemed like a good humanitarian project. The factual analysis did not seem to be very important at the time. Sufficient facts about the receiver administration, the educational and training pursuits at the boystown, the experience other institutions like the Ford Foundation had had at the boystown, etc. had not been obtained. The supporters of Alami and his boystown were the ones providing Bigler, Wilkinson, and others with the positive feedback but they each had a vested interest at stake and would not present anything contrary to this interest.

The issues and problems had not been discussed openly and completely with Wilkinson, R. H. Walker, Hugh Walker, Alami and others. Therefore, much misunderstanding had taken place. The planning and problems were not worked out jointly. In addition, no one from BYU actually understood the feudal landlord thinking process and ways of Alami. This was the source of many problems. This is why it is very important to know the people you are dealing with, their customs, traditions, religion, etc. These human factors have a tremendous influence upon the thinking and business processes of the people.

Alami had very little knowledge about the dairy industry and yet Alami wanted a fully equipped dairy plant which would be modern in every respect. However, he did not understand that there were not adequate funds available to set up such a plant, nor was a big plant necessary in order to process the small amount of milk the project would produce. R. H. Walker realized that a very simple plant was all that was needed to pasteurize the milk for the students' use and possibly to process ice cream.

Perhaps the project would have been more successful had they done more research before beginning it. All the problems can never be foreseen,

however, some of the problems which arose between Alami and Mikkelsen could have been avoided if R. H. Walker would have had more discussion with Bigler and Alami. Walker himself should have gone to the project and visited with the personnel and others who knew Alami personally. A thorough investigation into Alami's qualifications and educational practices ought to have been carried out. The humanitarian appeal blinded the need for a thorough feasibility study and Alami's charm seemed to dissuade the need for a true evaluation of Alami's administration, intents, and purposes.

The greatest handicap to the project was Alami's feudal-landlord manner of management. Too much power was in his hands to dictate what, when, and how the project would be implemented and operationalized. Neither party planned the actual implementation very well. Alami's lack of knowledge concerning dairy cows, dairy management, and milk processing was responsible for the improper planning of the phases and sequence of implementation. Bigler, Wilkinson, and BYU followed Alami's lead because they did not have a full knowledge of the situation. The project's success was hampered by the poor planning.

The general plan and objective of helping Alami obtain the dairy equipment, construct the necessary edifices, obtain the first cows, operationalize the farm, and train the refugee boys at the boystown was obvious, but the details were not analyzed sufficiently in the beginning.

2. Select projects for action which concern recognized needs.

The dairy project began because of the interest several individuals had in the receiving institution and its developer Alami. The Palestinian refugee problem was still a very important issue in international politics in the 1950's and 1960's so there was a recognized need to try to provide a better way of life for

the refugees. The dairy project was Alami's idea of enhancing the diet of the boys and at the same time providing dairy management training and milk processing skills to numerous young men at the boystown. In addition, the original intent was to help make the boystown self-sufficient and supply other people in the area with milk products.

However, BYU found itself in a unique situation because the Alami project in essence selected BYU. President Wilkinson's contacts and influence upon some of the leaders of the LDS Church opened the way for funding from the LDS Church through its educational facility, the Brigham Young University. These funds were used to buy several dairy animals in Holland and transport the cattle to Jordan.

The project met Alami's desire to provide fresh milk and ice cream to many boys. The small number of cows prevented the milking parlor from being used more efficiently and economically. Likewise the processing plant equipment was used very little because of the lack of milk volume produced and butter fat to operate the processing equipment.

The dairy did provide sufficient milk for the boys and baby calves. Once in awhile if there was a competent dairy technologist at the boystown dairy, the boys would get ice cream.

Even though the dairy provided many boys with the opportunity to learn dairy management and milk processing, there was very little need at the time for such training in the region.

3. Orient the project to the existing technical, economic, and social level of the receiving institution in order to make the project achievable.

The dairy project was truly oriented to the receivers but Alami was the main receiver because the dairy was a fulfillment of his dream. Alami

wanted a show case modern dairy—the best in the Middle East. He was not concerned about the project being too extensive. The Ford Foundation had promised to provide the funds for the milking parlor, processing plant, and equipment if Alami could get the dairy animals donated. Since others would be paying for all of the project he wanted the biggest and the best whether it was practical or not.

The social factor that the boys were not used to drinking cows' milk and tending animals did not deter Alami and he was depending on Bigler at first for the technical help and later this burden fell upon BYU. BYU was not aware of the tradition that women cared for the animals. They simply assumed that Alami knew what he was doing and that hundreds of young men would thrill at the opportunity to learn the details of dairy management and the processing of dairy by-products. In reality only a handful of young men took advantage of the opportunity.

The skilled labor necessary to continue the processing operation has always been a weak point, and the non-achievability of the dairy becoming self-sufficient became evident with the inability of the management to produce and properly store the necessary forage requirements of the cattle. Even though the climate and soil conditions in the Jordan Valley would allow as many as ten cuttings of alfalfa each year, the ability to supply the necessary hay requirements was sufficient for only a small herd of cows. The harvesting methods were archaic. The project had the capacity to supply more feed but due to the poor management practices this was not achieved. This was one of the problems which should have been dealt with but Alami did not want anyone doing any studies of the farm problems. BYU was really never involved in the planning nor in the problem solving unless the issue was a high priority to Alami such as

obtaining the dairy equipment, the cows, and setting up the equipment. BYU was to help set up the farm and operationalize it, to make it all properly functional, but it was not in a position to analyze and help solve other problems.

The finances were somewhat nebulous. The Ford Foundation provided the funds for the dairy equipment and the buildings but Alami had to find the capital for the cows and their transportation to the farm. This was his greatest frustration and over one and a half years elapsed before the necessary capital was obtained to get the project started. The funding problem became very frustrating for all that had an interest in the project.

After all the expense to build such a modern dairy, the processing plant and equipment was far too large and unreasonable to maintain and operate feasibly and economically. The major reason for this was the incorrect technical rationality. Alami wanted the milking parlor and processing plant constructed and ready for the cows when they arrived. However, no one seemed to point out the fact that the size of the facilities would require many cows already in production to utilize it. R. H. Walker and Wilkinson did mention that the requested facilities were too large for the ADS, but since they were not dairymen and not really part of the planning, they were unable to change Alami's mind. They also failed to recognize the lapse of time needed for the small quantity of bred heifers and calves to grow in sufficient production and herd size to be able to utilize the facilities. In actuality the cows should have been bought and shipped to the boystown two to three years before the large facilities were built. By the end of two years there were only enough cows milking to warrant only a small milking parlor. The facilities could have been built in stages. The first should have been to acquire enough bred heifers and then wait for them to come into production in sufficient numbers to warrant a large milking parlor.

Once this was built, equipped, and operationalized, then an adequate processing plant could have been studied, planned, built and equipped as the need was ascertained. As it was, the huge processing plant was never efficiently utilized.

The only immediate need that was met was Alami's desire to build a modern milking and processing plant. Then as the bred heifers and calves arrived the reality of the poor technical rationale and the poor coordination and integration of activities became apparent.

In addition to the economic and technical orientation which is needed, the selected personnel to administer the on-site project need an orientation of the culture, religion, and traditions to avoid as many conflicts as possible. Because of this deficiency in planning and implementation, BYU found its personnel involved in several conflicts. At the time BYU was involved in the dairy project there were no qualified Middle East scholars at BYU. This lack of qualified resource personnel was a detriment then; however, in the past twenty years BYU has developed the Kennedy Center which has promoted curriculum and studies in many areas including the Middle East.

Mikkelsen and Bigler did not receive much instruction concerning the Arabs and their customs, traditions and the Islamic religion. This is evident by a letter sent to Mikkelsen and Bigler while they were in Holland. Wilkinson was pleased that they had been set apart as missionaries before leaving Salt Lake City so they could have the authority to hold meetings and proselyte only as proper by law and according to circumstances. Wilkinson made it clear that they could not proselyte while they were working except through righteous conduct. Even in the evening hours any proselyting would have to be done with great tact.

Wilkinson emphasized that they were guests of the country of Jordan and it was important that they obey the laws and be courteous to the people at all times. It is important he said, to respect the customs of the people and their

way of life and particularly their religious beliefs and activities. The problem was that they had not been informed as to what these laws and customs were.

Bigler's letter to President Moyle in January 1961 with a complaint about how Mrs. Mikkelsen conducted herself in public is a case in point. Even her desire to go swimming with the boys at the boystown is against the customs in the Islamic countries. This lack of awareness of how to conduct herself in Holland and especially in Islamic countries needed some attention to avoid unnecessary problems and conflicts in the host country. Wilkinson's comment that this complaint was evidence showing wisdom on his part for not having put Bigler in charge was poor judgment. His personality conflict with Bigler was causing Wilkinson to make brash and uncalled for comments. It was Wilkinson's responsibility to see that the Mikkelsens and Bigler were well oriented to the intentions and purposes of the project and how they should conduct themselves. Religious and cultural orientations ought to have been provided to avoid improper desires. Wilkinson turned the responsibility of informing the Mikkelsens and Bigler over to R. H. Walker and he tried to explain in a letter what they should and should not do. This lack of preparation was a detriment to the success of the project.

The Mikkelsen's alleged incident of telling the Christian boys that they were being mistreated by the Muslim boys could have been avoided if the proper religious orientation had been provided. The religious situation was uncomfortable for Mrs. Mikkelsen and she became directly involved as she attempted to help the Christian boys. However, when personnel are assigned to foreign countries, one must be more careful and acknowledge the existing system and not interfere until one has the permission or authority to do so.

Wilkinson and R. H. Walker tried in a post hoc fashion to inform the Mikkelsens and Bigler of the need to learn and understand the customs and

religions in the foreign land they were assigned to, but it was too late and too little. This was part of the source for the poor working relationship the Mikkelsens were experiencing. Proper bonds between Alami and Mikkelsen did not occur and Alami had a large share in the blame. Mikkelsen tried to get along with Alami but with the difficulties he experienced in working with Alami, Mikkelsen probably had the feeling that he would "get along at all costs" just to achieve his purpose of implementing the project. The strife and contention which arose definitely suppressed the good intentions and desires of Mikkelsen and Smoot to teach and share ideas with Alami and among the staff and students at the ADS.

The problems Mikkelsen had seemingly caused him to withdraw somewhat from the other staff at the ADS. The language barrier was an additional handicap. However, Mikkelsen should have mustered greater inner strength to reach out to the other staff and gain their friendship and learn from them. A bond of friendship with the ADS personnel could have given Mikkelsen added help and understanding to achieve his purpose at the ADS as well as to better understand Alami and how he could work with him. Alami placed more importance on personal relationships, but first Mikkelsen had to prove himself by gaining his trust and confidence. Mikkelsen was not able to achieve this with Alami, possibly because Alami had never liked BYU's choice to send Mikkelsen rather than Bigler, although he verbally accepted this decision.

Mikkelsens and Bigler were sent off in a hurry to implement the project. The old adage that "haste makes waste" came true. Wilkinson and R. H. Walker should have made sure that the participants obtained a thorough orientation of the culture, religion and even some language by qualified instructors.

After the Mikkelsens came home, the Smoots were sent over to set up the equipment. They were not given any orientation either. Mrs. Smoot experienced a cultural shock—seeing the beggars, how bread was handled without a wrapper, etc. She felt she was in a completely different world and was frightened of being so far from familiar things and people. The food and the way it was handled at the boystown repulsed her. She could hardly wait to go to Jerusalem and find some American style groceries. The Smoots knew nothing of the Arab monetary system and were perplexed to see Alami's home under armed guard and the boystown protected by fences and two metal gates with sentries at each one. The sentries looked so dark and foreign in their traditional Arab robes with a large knife in their belt.¹³⁵

Some of the fears and problems of the Smoots and the Mikkelsens could have been avoided had they been alerted to the living conditions they were to be experiencing. The BYU administration should have had a planned and well-executed means of orienting the personnel that were to be sent to the on-site project in the foreign land. In addition, the administrative personnel in the home country ought to be required to attend the same orientation to understand the problems and conditions the in-country personnel are subjected to.

The living and sanitation conditions in the foreign country should have been explained. An orientation of buying, preparing and eating the local food stuffs could have reduced the alarm encountered by anyone going into a particular country. Mrs. Smoot in particular would have been better prepared for what she experienced. Likewise, an orientation as to the housing conditions, costs, transportation needs, and problems is needed and will reduce the cultural shock somewhat. The purpose for the orientation of the living conditions is to better prepare the personnel mentally and emotionally for their new

assignment. This orientation can reduce the adjustment period and minimize time loss and increase the productivity of the personnel. Settling in assistance should be given to the families and especially to the wives. Recreational opportunities should be provided and if the project is of six months duration or more, then travel opportunities out of the country ought to be provided to enhance productivity of the personnel.

BYU did not provide an orientation on living conditions or settling in assistance. No travel was provided other than to and from the project site. The Mikkelsens were without transportation most of the time and had to rely on others to take them to Jericho and Jerusalem to get groceries and other items. The Mikkelsens and Smoots had been left totally on their own except for what the people at the ADS offered in the way of assistance in their new environment.

4. Clearly define the objectives at all levels in terms that people will understand and with no obvious hidden agendas.

The overall objective of helping to set up a dairy project at the boystown was obvious but the details were missing and had to be worked out as they were encountered.

At first Bigler was to get the cows donated in the United States but this failed. Then he found out that it would cost too much to fly them to Jordan if he did get them donated. Then it was suggested to buy them in Europe and transport them by steamship, but there was still no money available for this until the LDS Church finally donated some money. Once this problem was solved, then the arrangements for Mikkelsens and Bigler were finalized. Mikkelsen was informed of what his tasks would be. There was not much chance of someone duplicating his tasks because he was the only one there who knew what needed to be done and how to do it. However, he was not given any expressed time tables

other than he was to be at the boystown for two years. The idea was to try and finish the construction aspect of the project and get the dairy and processing plant in operation as soon as possible. It was frustrating for Mikkelsen because the workers took longer than he had expected to get things done.

There was clearly a lack of objectives stipulated which the local personnel could understand and at the same time the custom in that area is that the people do things according to how they are used to doing them. There is no rush to finish things and exactness is not an important trait. The local workers did not understand the importance of laying out a floor plan exactly as it ought to be so the equipment will fit properly. Alami himself was not concerned enough to see that the workers were informed of the importance of exactness. Problems like this should have been reasoned out among Alami, Mikkelsen and the workers, but unfortunately they were not. The objectives were not clear nor important enough from the workers point of view. This caused a greater rift between Alami and Mikkelsen and hampered the efficiency of getting the building constructed and without this phase being completed it was impossible to begin the next phase of installing the equipment.

R. H. Walker and Wilkinson were not aware of all the problems that Mikkelsen and later Smoot were having at the boystown. There was no plan for evaluating the progress of the project. Mikkelsen was not required to make periodic reports and no one was sent from BYU to help evaluate the progress nor help to solve the many problems which arose. The fact that Mikkelsen was having trouble getting the equipment set up should have motivated Wilkinson to send someone qualified to assist in completing the project. However, the lack of planning and funds to do so prevented him from helping to achieve this objective. The lack of reports from Alami hindered Wilkinson's ability to truly

understand the real reasons why Mikkelsen was not having success in achieving this objective.

The experiences Mikkelsen had should have been reported directly to Wilkinson and the problems should have been seriously listened to. The practical learning experiences at the project site are very critical in determining whether the objectives were well defined or whether the objectives need to be altered to better fit the needs of the project and help the personnel achieve the objectives. The BYU project could have benefited greatly by having had well-defined objectives. When the objectives were not being met some assistance should have been provided to help solve the problems.

The ADS boystown was seen by Bigler, Wilkinson and many others as a great humanitarian effort. But a hidden agenda arose in the thinking of President Wilkinson. Wilkinson had instigated the plan to have Bigler and Mikkelsen set apart as missionaries in case they had the opportunity to hold meetings or teach the gospel to those interested in knowing about the Mormon Church.¹³⁶ Wilkinson's missionary zeal was perhaps a big factor in his becoming involved. He had visions of many Arab young men coming to BYU for their higher education. He planned on at least two coming each year from the boystown near Jericho. In addition, R. H. Walker was hoping that some of the general authorities of the Mormon Church could look into the possibility of expanding their emphasis into doing missionary work among the Arab people.¹³⁷

Mrs. Mikkelsen was accused of gathering the Christian boys around her and suggesting that they were being abused because of their religion. Though this may not have been a hidden agenda for her at the outset of her involvement, it did become a factor, whether it occurred to her or not, because it had the impact upon Alami and his staff the same as if it had been a planned hidden

agenda. Alami became more skeptical of the Mikkelsens and more distrusting and irritated by them. It was just one more incident which skewed his thinking against them. It interfered with their working relations and human relations.

The hidden agenda of missionary work was not a weighty matter but it became a factor to the personnel at the project site. The missionary zeal was very low key but the incidents which were seemingly harmless incidents to the Mikkelsens and Wilkinson were perceived as another matter to Alami and his personnel. It is better to stay far from incidents like the one Mrs. Mikkelsen was involved in to avoid blemishing the success of the project.

Alami's hidden agenda that emerged was that he apparently was never interested in making the dairy or the farms self-sufficient. He used the boystown as a humanitarian appeal to obtain funds for his farms and schools. The farms initially were to provide the funds necessary to finance the schools and provide all the needs for the refugee boys. This ideal was never achieved. Alami sought after unstated political, economic, and personal benefits as attested to by Imam's quotation that Alami exploited the project to his own advantage and it was some time before Wilkinson even realized the effects of Alami's hidden agenda and it certainly created a disillusionment and distrust in Wilkinson's mind. This is a prime example of why hidden agendas should not be pursued. Both entities of the BYU-ADS were guilty of misusing the project for unspecified purposes and it became self-defeating and detrimental to the project.

BYU failed to define any objectives other than helping Alami set up a model dairy in Jericho. Because of this the personnel of both entities had many problems in achieving the goal of setting up and operationalizing the project. The project could have proceeded much better if Wilkinson and Alami would have

defined the objectives even if they were solely those of Alami. At least both parties would have understood them and Alami may have been more helpful in achieving them. Moreover, if there had been more understanding of the objectives of each party perhaps the project could have been more easily implemented. There was a failure to delineate the objectives in a signed contract.

The problem of the hidden agendas could have been at least partially avoided if more knowledge and understanding of each party would have been known and if the objectives would have been clearly defined for the project. All issues and motives should have been discussed openly. However, it is not possible to prevent all problems. The intentions and purposes of all people cannot be controlled and anticipated in the defining of objectives. In this case it appears that Wilkinson's motives were well intended but became a big issue. The real intent of Alami may never really be known but there is evidence that Alami did not plan or work to make the boystown self-sufficient while Mikkelsen and Smoot were involved in the dairy project.

5. Use open communication and democratic methods in developing the project.

The communication problems are intertwined throughout all facets of a project. However, in the ADS-BYU dairy project the communication problems deserve some special attention because the decision-making was not a bilateral process nor were the facts clear to each side.

Communications problems and misunderstandings were excessive from the outset of the project. Bigler understood that when he was set apart as a missionary to Jericho that he was to report directly to the First Presidency of the LDS Church. However, he was informed later that this meant only in missionary matters. The dairy project was a "BYU" project and Bigler was to report directly to Wilkinson.¹³⁸

Wilkinson became frustrated many times with the indirect information he was receiving from Alami and the Mikkelsens. R. H. Walker, for example, had received a letter from Bigler stating that he had received a letter from Mikkelsen informing him that he was in a hospital with hepatitis and was getting better. Wilkinson wrote to Mikkelsen expressing his desire for him to write directly to BYU on all matters in the future. Wilkinson did not like the idea of getting the information second or third hand. Direct communications would allow BYU to work more expeditiously if anything needed to be done. In addition, direct correspondence was always more satisfying and much less likely to be distorted.¹³⁹

Mikkelsen was on his own in Jericho with no support system; therefore, he would write to Bigler for help and understanding. The working relationship was poor between Mikkelsen and Alami. Alami wanted all things done in his way and when and if he wanted them done. There were never any clear and open channels of communication. Neither problems nor achievements were discussed regularly with all personnel and administrators. The project was Alami's and he had to have total control. Alami did not confide in Wilkinson nor did he communicate to Wilkinson the problems he had expressed to others that he was having with the Mikkelsens. Alami did not act tactfully and directly when the problems arose. There was relatively no dialogue which could have facilitated more feedback and unity of purpose. Mikkelsen did not communicate his problems with Alami to Wilkinson.

The flow of ideas, problems, and feelings did not occur. Therefore, Wilkinson never obtained a clear picture of problems and events at the ADS. Wilkinson had no way of appropriately reconciling the problems.

Mikkelsen and Smoot were both hampered by the poor and indirect communication which definitely handicapped BYU's ability to properly plan and execute the implementation of a sound project.

Wilkinson in turn was not getting a clear picture of the problems Mikkelsen and Smoot were having with Alami. During his evaluation of Wilkinson's file on the ADS, Cleon Skousen had talked with Smoot and Mikkelsen and had discussed the difficulty they each had had with Alami. He felt that these two men had a better understanding of the operation of the project than anyone else in the Utah area because of the combined two and a half years they had worked at the ADS. However, since Bigler was always enthusiastic and accentuating the positive and playing down the negative, Smoot and Mikkelsen were hesitant to say anything negative. Everyone had been hoping that the project would become a shining success. Skousen even admitted that he had been reluctant to say anything derogative about the project.

In reality Wilkinson was receiving propaganda reports from the Alami Foundation in New York and the personnel who were sent over by BYU did not want to jeopardize the project with any negative feedback. In Smoot's written report to Wilkinson some time after the report discrepancies were showing up, Smoot stated that he was asked to report on his achievements at the ADS and was not given the time or even asked about the problems he had. So he did not bother to report problems, especially since Bigler and Wilkinson were so optimistic and high on the ADS-BYU dairy project.

Mikkelsen never did feel a part of Alami's staff. His working relationship with Alami was hampered by the poor channels of communication. He was not prepared properly for his in-country assignment and when he was considered out-of-line, Alami did not confront him directly to discuss the matter

judiciously and tactfully. Alami should have reported all incidents to Wilkinson directly and promptly but he failed to do this. In Mikkelsen's case, Alami did not want the equipment set up so there was no deadline or rush to accomplish this task.

The decision-making process at the boystown was never a democratic system. It was Alami's project and the tradition of the wealthy, like Alami, was to use feudal landlord tactics. If Alami did not agree with implementing a particular innovation, it was not implemented. This incompatibility between Alami and Mikkelsen was eventually the cause for having Mikkelsen return home early. BYU as the sender organization never knew all the problems which Mikkelsen was facing with Alami and Mikkelsen never knew of all the complaints Alami had expressed against him nor the real reason of why he was asked to return to BYU early.

The decisions Alami made were not always in line with his financial capabilities. Alami was often asking for more donations. His decisions were not always in line with the overall objective of the project. The project was to be self-sufficient and self-supporting but at times he would have crops ploughed down which could have been harvested or given to the refugees or poor people in the area. Then he would immediately make pleas for additional donations. He would sell calves which he should have kept to build up a larger herd, and then he would ask for more donations of animals.

The proper use of communication channels could have enhanced the democratic decision-making, but Alami would have no part of it. The project was going to be administered his way. He was completely involved in it but there was not going to be much change on his part unless he wanted and asked for the change. There was a basic relationship problem from the beginning but

little could have been done to change Alami. Even those who knew him best could not work with him. If they had ideas of their own and a desire to change things, Alami would oppose them and prevent any changes. This was Amer Salti's experience and he even grew up under Alami's system and had returned for a time to manage the farm. Salti was not able to develop the democratic decision-making process which he desired. Even his communication channels were poor so he had to leave the project to save their friendship.

6. Keep the project flexible to meet long-term situations and short-term changes and special emergencies.

Wilkinson and R. H. Walker were wise to have someone go to the project who could stay for two years or more if needed to give the project continuity. However, since Alami and Bigler had become good friends, this presented some conflicts and biased Alami's view of Mikkelsen. The decision by BYU to allow Bigler to go along with the Mikkelsens was an example of flexibility, and ultimately the decision to have Mikkelsen return six months early was an example of an unexpected change. Even though it violated the theory of continuity, the fact that Wilkinson and Alami had agreed to send Mikkelsen home shows the ability to make changes when one party was not satisfied with the situation. Wilkinson eventually reacted to the situation where Mikkelsen had been involved in a situation he did not fully belong. In reality, however, Alami's attitude toward Mikkelsen was poor and his removal was in the best interest of the project. There was not a strong need for him to remain since Alami wanted someone else to install the equipment. Alami had achieved his immediate desire to build the cow sheds and milking parlor and processing plant as well as receiving a few bred heifers to start the dairy operation. Moreover, there was little need for the year and a half Mikkelsen was there to set up the equipment.

Alami prevented Mikkelsen from setting up the equipment and blamed his so-called inability to get it done. The timing for its installation was not critical at all and this left plenty of time and flexibility to find someone else to eventually replace Mikkelsen and set up the equipment. The lack of funds to send someone to help Mikkelsen install the equipment was a serious problem in flexibility. It was a weakness which hampered the completion of the project. Even though time was not a critical factor in getting the equipment set up, the inability to help Mikkelsen get it done hampered the project because of the bad reports being spread about Mikkelsen's inability to set it up. The other problems probably became accentuated because of Alami's dissatisfaction with Mikkelsen on this issue. Alami's needs were not being met as he had anticipated they would be and this caused conflict among them.

If more funds had been available there would have been more flexibility to the project as to having Bigler participate in the project of buying and shipping the cows and staying longer at the project. A more qualified man could have gone to help Mikkelsen set up the equipment and to help in many other ways. The financial straits caused many of the problems encountered in helping to implement the project and in achieving the objectives much sooner than they were. Maybe then Alami would have been more pleased with Mikkelsen's efforts and desires to help make the project successful.

7. Make the project educational and direct it toward bringing about improvement in the ability of the people to solve their own problems.

One of the primary intents of the dairy project was an educational tool to train many young men in the skills of dairy management and milk processing. One of the limiting factors of the young men's interest was the fact that they were not accustomed to cows' milk and it was not traditionally the

men's or the boys' place to care for the animals. It was the tradition for the women and girls to take care of the animals. However, there were a few boys who had an interest and were trained in the project. Some of these young men graduated and found jobs with dairymen in various areas in that region of the world. For these young men it was a positive educational experience. They were the recipients of a new technology and skills which had not been available to them prior to the BYU-ADS dairy project.

The project was educational for the donors also and especially for the Mikkelsens and Smoots who learned a great deal about the recipients and how to work with them and teach them. The project did provide the opportunity for some young men who took advantage of it to better their lives by learning and applying this new knowledge, skills and technology. Mikkelsen was aware of his purpose of training those interested and he related that both he and the young men were gratified by the achievements they were able to attain. The quality and depth of training was never stipulated so the extent to which the young men were able to better solve their own problems from the training they received is unknown.

There was a need to establish more long-range training programs to ensure the availability of qualified personnel to operate all aspects of the dairy project. This could have helped in making the dairy project a viable economic unit.

8. The project should be carried out by well-trained personnel, effectively supervised.

BYU selected Mikkelsen because they thought he was qualified from a technical point of view, but the new environment, his incompatibility with Alami, and the working conditions created some problems. Alami was not

qualified to supervise Mikkelsen and evidently Mikkelsen had some concerns himself about being able to set up the equipment alone. BYU did not sufficiently investigate this potential problem. Bigler made things worse by trying to promote his own aspirations and by telling Alami that Mikkelsen had told him that he was not sure he could set up the equipment.

BYU did, however, succeed in sending personnel who were committed to doing everything possible to ensure the success of the project. The basic nature of Mikkelsen and Smoot was to succeed at whatever they undertook. An administration needs to select men of this calibre. This character trait greatly enhanced the implementation and relative success of the dairy project.

BYU should have sent a man with more practical experience in setting up the dairy equipment. Mikkelsen had problems relating to and communicating with the personnel on the dairy project and one reason was because of the language barrier. Alami accused him of isolating himself from the others. The ideal situation would have been to find a dairy technologist fluent in Arabic. However, even if the personnel just tried to learn some words and mingle with the other personnel a good friendship can develop and the isolation will not become such a problem. In Mikkelsen's letters, it was apparent that he was very patient and his advocate, Tom Dammann, stated that he was working under very difficult circumstances. Smoot also complemented Mikkelsen on the fine work he was able to accomplish and some of the people spoke well of him at the boystown.

Mikkelsen seemed to be reasonably compatible with others but not so much with Alami. This was a detriment to the project as was the fact that he was not able to set up the equipment. Mikkelsen and Smoot were strongly committed in trying to do all they were capable of in making the project a

success. One drawback was that they were alone and had no one to bolster them and help them in the times of need.

Smoot was very committed to getting the equipment set up and operationalized. He had the technical ability and determination plus the circumstance that Alami was gone a great deal of the time that Smoot was setting up the equipment. Otherwise he admitted that it would have taken much longer to achieve his objectives.

9. Good project planning provides for evaluation of the results.

The objectives were not clearly or carefully defined and this makes it hard to evaluate a project.

Mikkelsen and Alami should have written formal reports of the problems and achievements, and Wilkinson should have demanded reports. In this manner Mikkelsen's experiences and problems could have been better understood and pondered by Wilkinson and R. H. Walker. Perhaps they could have realized the need to implement a better support and communication system.

Wilkinson and R. H. Walker should have contacted other individuals who were knowledgeable of the ADS and Alami but not having a vested interest in the ADS. By so doing they would have gained additional information which would have alerted them to Alami's explosive disposition at times, his feudal lordship attitude, and other facts which could have minimized the problems which occurred. Wilkinson and R. H. Walker were not fully aware of the native ways of thinking and doing things and much less that of Alami and his intents and purposes for the ADS.

Alami's objectives were not fully understood by those at BYU; therefore, it was impossible to evaluate the results. BYU was not directly involved in the planning of the project. They were basically involved in only

helping Alami achieve his own goal of building a dairy project. BYU indirectly planned to help get the cattle and the dairy technologist to aid in this humanitarian cause. Because of this ad hoc relationship BYU had very little control over the actual implementation schedule and its periodic evaluation. The lack of reporting to BYU and the lack of supervision other than Mikkelsen's on-site self-supervision was a deficiency on BYU's part. Wilkinson should have had more follow-up on Mikkelsen by someone going to Jericho to evaluate the progress and see and experience first hand the difficulties Mikkelsen was having. On a couple of occasions Wilkinson did have someone look in on Mikkelsen but this was only superficial. To know the problems someone should have gone there and stayed for some time. People are always on good behavior when strangers come for only a short period of time.

BYU should have taken a more active part in planning and evaluating the project once it became officially involved. This should have been another one of the stipulations when the money was donated. This deficiency led to many difficulties encountered by Mikkelsen and Smoot and allowed Alami, a man with no dairy experience, to control the planning and implementation of a million dollar dairy facility. The result was a show place which has never been fully and consistently operationalized. There were not any objectives defined for the quality and depth of training to be done with the assistants to Mikkelsen and Smoot as well as to the young men. These objectives should have been stipulated and followed up on. The short-term involvement resulted in inadequate training and supervision of personnel to manage and operate the dairy and the milk processing equipment.

The project could have been more successful if there had been provisions made to monitor and evaluate all aspects of the dairy project. This

principle essentially was not planned for at all. There was no proper measurement criteria nor any methods of information collection. Wilkinson did not even ask for any evaluation except for the personal reports of Mikkelsen and Smoot upon their return. He only asked for the achievements and left little if any room for discussion of the problems. It was years later when Wilkinson began to receive negative feedback which prompted him to investigate more about the contradictions he was receiving. His collection of information on the project was biased because a large portion came from reports sent out by the Alami Foundation which sought friends and sympathy to help support the humanitarian project.

Conclusion

BYU did not obtain enough factual information about Alami and the dairy he planned. BYU undertook the project rather blindly. The recognized need was to supply the refugee orphan boys with dairy products to improve their diet and to provide training in dairy management. The problem was that it was "Alami's Dairy" and it was primarily developed to meet Alami's dream and secondarily it met the objective of supplying dairy products and training for the boys. The orientation of the project was to the receivers but Alami became the main receiver. The project was too grandiose and did not fit the technical, economic, or social level of the receivers in general. The achievability of the project was greatly hampered by Alami's poor management ability, his incorrect technical rationality, and his feudal landlord tactics. The lack of financial planning also made it more difficult to achieve the objectives. Moreover, the lack of orientation of the culture, religion, and traditions added to the conflicts and lack of productivity at the project site. The deficiency decreased the achievability and success of the project.

Alami's objectives were not fully known by BYU; therefore, they were not clearly defined. This was a great weakness in the project and the problems which arose from the hidden agendas by both parties strained the relationship of the BYU-ADS project. In addition, the communication problems were a big detriment to the project. The lack of direct communication and proper reporting of problems made it difficult for Wilkinson to ascertain how to help the on-site BYU personnel. Alami's feudal landlord tactics made a democratic decision-making process non-existent. Alami wanted and had full control.

The project was somewhat flexible to short-term and emergency changes. This was possible because of BYU's real lack of management involvement in the project. What Alami wanted, he eventually received and BYU was able to adapt and let him have his way. The real inflexibility arose from the lack of funds available for Wilkinson to send someone over to help Mikkelsen set-up the equipment and to help supervise the project.

The project was definitely educational for all involved but the ability of the project to improve the receivers' problem solving skills is not really ascertainable. Only a few boys took advantage of the training and improved their livelihood substantially but the ability of the managers to continue the dairy and processing operations was questionable. They were not capable of keeping the milk production and quality up nor in operating the processing equipment without the aid of an outside dairy technologist. Even with the well trained technologists which BYU had sent to the project, the project was not successful in creating a situation where the receiver personnel could carry on without outside help in some areas of management. Possibly a longer-term was needed to overcome this weakness. The project had relatively well-trained personnel from the donors but the BYU supervision was insufficient to help Mikkelsen in times of need. There

had been a need to send additional help to eventually install the processing equipment. This could have been achieved much earlier than it was and it might have reduced the personality conflicts and issues which arose from them.

The project really lacked proper planning and as a result there were no clearly defined objectives, no contractual agreement, and no means for gathering data nor in properly monitoring the on-site project. These shortcomings prevented any opportunity for BYU to share in the control and evaluation of the dairy project.

The failure of the BYU-ADS dairy project to follow such principles as those outlined in chapter two presents evidence showing the necessity of following the principles stated in this thesis. If these principles would have been set forth and followed they would have enhanced the understanding of the motives for building such a dairy project. These principles would have enhanced the clarity of the project, they would have solved many of the personality conflicts and misunderstanding from the beginning to the end, they would have enhanced the implementation of a good project and they would have facilitated the resource flow. These principles cannot always be followed completely in various socio-cultural contexts but by attempting to follow such guidelines the probability for success can be increased.

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ENDNOTES

ENDNOTES

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

List of Main Characters

- Alami, Musa Bey (1897-1984). Born in Jerusalem and was the president of the Arab Development Society (ADS) and the developer of the boys' refugee ranch at Jericho, Jordan. He received his law degree from Cambridge University in England and was very active in politics in Palestine. He was the highest ranking Arab in the British Mandate Government. Alami gave up his political career to devote his life to helping the peasants improve their lot in life. However, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War changed his emphasis and that of the ADS to finding a solution for resettling the thousands of Palestinian Arab refugees.
- Ashton, Ralph. Poultry producer in the Salt Lake area. Bigler selected him to go to Jericho as the poultry specialist for the ADS.
- Bigler, Louis Bertrand (1899-1984). Born in Fountain Green, Utah and became a successful businessman. He also developed a Jersey dairy farm in West Jordan, Utah. Alami had visited Utah and Bigler at his dairy. Bigler became very interested in helping Alami and was instrumental in finding and purchasing the necessary milking parlor and milk processing plant equipment. Bigler was also involved in trying to obtain cattle donations to send to Jericho. He later went to Holland where he and Mikkelsen bought the cattle and continued on to the ADS farm at Jericho for two months.
- Burns, Norman. Worked for the American Embassy in Jordan. He was involved with the "Point Four" program which granted the ADS project \$75,000 per year to care for an additional one hundred refugee boys at the ADS boys farm. He is also related to Bigler, his mother being a Bigler.
- Burton, Theodore M. General Authority in the LDS Church. He set Bigler and Mikkelsen apart as missionaries before they left Salt Lake City for Jericho.
- Clark, Dale. Worked for the "Point Four" program in Washington, D.C. and had been to the Middle East checking on the aid programs. He became interested in the Alami project as early as 1951. At the time of his involvement in Utah he was working for the Davis County Bank in Farmington, Utah. Clark was in charge of the funds allocated to purchase the dairy equipment. He was in favor of having President Wilkinson and BYU become involved in the project.
- Dajani, Shahadeh. Managed the ADS farm in the 1960's. He is an agronomist by profession.
- Dammann, Tom. News columnist for the Chicago Tribune, was at Aqaba and Jericho when the beef cattle were unloaded. He had an unpleasant response from Alami.

- Dekker, Peter. Was in charge of a clearing house firm in the Netherlands which was instrumental in helping the representatives from BYU find the desired cattle, and had them prepared and shipped.
- Drake, Gordon Eugene. Selected by Bigler to go to Jericho as the horticulture expert for the ADS farm.
- Ellsworth, Leo. Manager of the Deseret Farms of Florida Incorporated. Sanctioned selection and shipment of Santa Gertrudis beef cattle to Jericho.
- Fryer, Era Reese (Cy). Administrator in the International Voluntary Services. Was directly interested and involved with the Alami project.
- Furlonge, Sir Geoffrey. Author of Palestine, My Country, the biography of Musa El Alami.
- Hallam, Dr. Dean of the College of Biological and Agricultural Science at Brigham Young University. Worked closely with Ernest L. Wilkinson in trying to find qualified personnel to go to Jericho to aid the ADS.
- Hamameh, Reem. The daughter of a special friend of Alami and secretary to Alami in Jerusalem. She played an active role in teaching women crafts in the frontier villages and helped in the administration of the boys farm.
- Hawkins, David H. Assistant manager of the Deseret Farms of Florida Inc. He personally selected the beef cows and bulls sent to the ADS in Jericho.
- Hogan, Glen. Was a West Jordan, Utah dairyman who was well qualified in dairying and milk processing and the installation of such equipment. He had been asked to go to Jericho by Bigler to set up the dairy equipment. His health was poor and never made it to Jericho.
- Hopkins, Reverend Garland. Was affiliated with the Alami Foundation in New York and Secretary General of the World Fellowship of Muslims and Christians Inc.
- Imam, Fareed. A friend of King Hussein who handled most of the official tours of Jordan for the King.
- Johariah, George. Managed the ADS farm in early 1960's.
- Kolleck, Teddy. Mayor of Jerusalem and long-time friend of Alami and advocate of his boystown and farms at Jericho.
- Love, Kennett. Member of the Alami Foundation Advisory Board in New York and journalist by profession.
- McCowen, Dr. Monroe. Was in charge of the Food and Agriculture program in the Near East for the International Cooperative Association (ICA).

- McKay, David O. President of the LDS Church. Was the first LDS President with whom Alami became acquainted. President McKay was respected by Alami and McKay praised the great work Alami was engaged in. It was McKay who gave the ultimate approval for the funds which were used to purchase and ship the dairy cattle to Jericho.
- Mendenhall, Wendell. Chairman of the Building Committee of the LDS Church. This committee eventually stipulated the conditions under which the \$17,500 was granted to BYU for the purchase and shipment of the dairy cows from Holland to Jericho.
- Mikkelsen, Seymour. Was a professor in the Animal Science Department at BYU who had been selected to be the BYU representative in purchasing and shipping of the cattle and the operationalization of the dairy project in Jericho. He was to spend two years getting the dairy into operation and training the young men in every area of the dairy business.
- Morris, Authur J. Professor and dairy science expert at Utah State University. Bigler approached him for advice in selecting and purchasing the dairy equipment for the ADS.
- Moyle, Henry D. Counselor to President McKay of the LDS Church. He was favorable to the BYU-ADS dairy project and instrumental in getting beef cattle from the LDS Florida ranch donated to the ADS.
- Parr, Dr. W. O. President of the World Friendship Organization. Shipped the beef cattle donated from the Florida ranch as well as some dairy equipment.
- Peterson, Dean A. Administrative Assistant to Ernest L. Winkinson. Requested by ELW to review the ADS literature in ELW's possession and then report on his findings.
- Richards, Grant. Dairy specialist at BYU.
- Rynn, Donald. Was in the international transport business and a friend of Alami who eventually took over the responsibility of getting the dairy equipment to New York and preparing it for shipment to Jericho. He took care of all the paper work, clearance through customs, insurance, etc.
- Salah, Daoud. Nicknamed "The Prince". Managed the ADS farm in the late 1960's and was on the farm during the 1967 war as a member of the staff.
- Salti, Amer Omer. One of the Orphan boys taken in at the ADS by Alami, was the first to come to BYU to further his education. Later he managed the ADS farm in 1973.
- Skousen, Cleon. Was a professor at BYU and a tour director to the Holy Land. Had toured the ADS on different occasions.

Smoot, Neldon and Lola. Neldon was a Jersey dairyman in Centerville, Utah. He was hired to go to Jericho to set up the dairy parlor and processing plant equipment after Mikkelsen had left the boys farm. He spent approximately a year setting up the equipment and operationalizing the processing plant. He also trained some of the boys to care for the cows, do the milking, and process the milk.

Tarazi, Wahib. Government Veterinarian at Jericho. He spent much of his own time trying to upgrade the ADS dairy herd and its production during the post 1967 war period.

Walker, Hugh. Was the Ford Foundation representative in Beirut, Lebanon. He was very instrumental in obtaining large grants for the Alami project. He helped Alami obtain necessary personnel to help in various areas to administer and teach at the ADS.

Walker, Rudger H. Had spent two years in Iran on the "Point Four" program administered by the Utah State University and upon his return became the Dean of Biological and Agricultural Science at BYU. President Wilkinson had put him in charge of the BYU project of aiding the ADS dairy project.

Wilkinson, Ernest L. Was the President of Brigham Young University. He took a great interest in Alami's dairy project and the refugee boys' school at Jericho in general. Wilkinson spearheaded the coordination of the approval of the funds from the LDS Church to purchase the cattle in Holland. He coordinated the attempts to obtain qualified personnel that Alami had requested to run the horticultural and poultry projects that had already been on going.

Wilson, M. L. He played a significant role in obtaining support for the Alami projects. He visited Wilkinson at BYU with the hope of getting Wilkinson involved in the Alami dairy project.